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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A substantial body of experimental evidence suggests that adult 
humans are highly sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of events. 
In the verbal learning paradigm that has most often been used to evaluate 
the abilities of persons to accurately estimate frequencies of presented 
target items, correlations between actual and estimated frequencies of 
occurrence have typically been in the high .80's (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 
1982). Having proposed the existence of two contrasting sets of cognitive 
processes, automatic and effortful (or controlled) processes, Hasher 
and Zacks (1979) proposed further that the ability to encode frequency 
information should be viewed as the result of an automatic process. 
Automatic processes are assumed to result in invariance of performance 
under different conditions of learning, are assumed not to be influenced 
by usually potent subject variables such as age, level of arousal, 
previous trials at a task, or educational level (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). 
Memory of frequency of occurrence has typically been investigated 
under the relatively controlled conditions of the psychology laboratory; 
thus, memory for frequency has typically included studies that have used 
simple, verbal material and relatively brief presentation times for target 
items. A few laboratory experiments have used stimuli other than neutral 
words or nonsense syllables, e.g., pictures of common objects {Hintzman 
& Rogers, 1973), emotionally charged verbal material {Curt, 1982), self-
reference statements (Rodgers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), and sex role 
appropriate behaviors (Perry & Bussey, 1979). The relationship between 
measures of frequency encoding and several subject variables also has 
been investigated, under controlled laboratory conditions. These 
have included age (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), learning ability (Goldstein, 
Hasher & Stein, 1983), depression (Curt, 1982), and learning set (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979). Several types of frequency judgments have been used as 
dependent variables. These have included absolute frequency, relative 
frequency, and category frequency measures. However, the use of the 
psychology laboratory, and the choice of procedures and stimulus materials 
used in investigating frequency encoding, make it difficult to generalize 
about memory for frequency of occurrence to naturalistic settings. 
The present study investigates memory for frequency of occurrence 
in the context of a larger study, designed to explore life situations and 
moods encountered by persons treated for substance abuse. The measures 
of frequency encoding were obtained during the first 90 days after 
discharge from an inpatient treatment facility. The primary goal of 
the present study was to determine if the high correlation observed in 
the laboratory between actual frequency of occurrence and estimates of 
frequency of occurrence could be observed in the more life-like situation 
experienced by recovering substance abusers. The subjects' self-reports 
of moods and experiences were the stimuli for which frequency judgments 
were made. The present study also addressed the question of whether 
substance abuse, a variable known to influence learning and memory in 
other contexts, affects accuracy of frequency estimates. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Approaches to Judgments of Frequency of Occurrence 
Limits in attentional capacity have been a central focus in models 
of cognitive functioning for some time (Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963; Keele, 1973; Treisman, 1960). Theorists originally 
proposed that these limits were most important at one particular stage of 
processing; however, more recently, Kahneman (1973) emphasized the 
allocation of attentional requirements to various functions at several 
different stages of processing. Kahneman proposed that attentional 
capacity has the following characteristics: (a) attentional capacity 
is limited; (b) individual differences and intra-individual variations 
in attentional capacity exist; (c) mental operations differ in the 
amount of attentional capacity that they require, with early processes 
such as sensory analysis requiring less attention than operations 
closer to the response end of the system; (d) variable capacity of 
attention interacts with encoding demands to influence performance on 
cognitive tasks. 
Building on this view of attentional requirements, Posner and 
Snyder (1974; 1979), Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and, more recently, 
Hasher and Zacks (1979; 1984) proposed that, given large amounts of 
practice, some complex operations (without regard to the stage of 
processing where they may occur) become "automatic." Automatic processes 
presumably occur with only a minimal allocation of attentional capacity, 
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thus leaving more capacity in the system to be allocated to less routine 
or novel functions. These "non-automatic" processes are described as 
effortful or controlled, and include such processes as retrieval 
strategies, mnemonics, and elaborative rehearsal. Effortful processes 
are described as having characteristics opposite to those of automatic 
processes, with all cognitive processes falling on a continuum between 
the extremes of fully automatic and fully effortful processes. This 
review will focus on some of the more salient, and controversial 
characteristics that have been suggested for automatic processes. 
Effortful processes are discussed mainly to clarify these characteristics, 
or to place them in the broader context of memory processes. 
The criteria by which a process is characterized as being automatic 
differ among the theorists cited above. Posner and Snyder (1975) define 
automatic processes as those that meet the following four criteria: 
(a) they occur with minimal attention; (b) they do not interfere with 
other, ongoing processing; (c) they do not result in the storage of 
new information in long-term memory (LTM); and (d) they develop only 
after large amounts of practice. 
Hasher and Zacks (1979) divide automatic processes according to 
their sources (either learned or hereditary) and consider the last two 
criteria posited by Posner and Snyder as applying only to learned 
automatic processes; that is, those acquired by repeated practice. 
Flavel (1977) proposed that automatic memory processes exist that do not 
depend on practice, but are inherited, or "wired" into the organism, 
comparable to Seligman' s ( 1970) "preparedness" concept (e.g., as suggested 
by one trial taste aversion learning). Hasher and Zacks, like Flavel, 
consider encoding of space, and frequency of occurrence attributes as 
automatic proceses stemming from innate, pre-wired capacities. 
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Although always conceptualizing automatic and effortful 
processes on a continuuum, Hasher and Zacks have identified criteria 
for evaluating their model that draw clear divisions between effortful 
and automatic processes in five contexts (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). The 
five areas and the criteria resulting from predicted differential 
effects on learning of effortful processes versus those of automatic 
processes are as follows: (a) intentional versus incidental learning 
conditions (i.e., automatic processes should not be influenced by 
variations in intentional or incidental learning conditions, while 
effortful processing should be affected by subjects' intent to learn); 
(b) instructions and practice (i.e., instructional set or number of 
previous trials should not influence automatic processes, while 
effortful processes should be facilitated by both); (c) developmental 
trends (i.e., after a basic maturational level has been met no 
differences should occur between young and old in automatic processing, 
while effortful processing should first increase in efficiency and then 
gradually decline across the lifespan); (d) interference among 
operations (i.e., automatic processes will allow other non-automatic 
processes to proceed simultaneously without disruption, while effortful 
processes compete for limited attentional capacity); and (e) states 
altering attentional capacity (i.e., automatic processes, in contrast 
to effortful processes, should function without decrement under 
different levels of arousal, states of depression or elation, or 
changes in capacity due to aging). 
Hasher and Zacks used these five criteria to contrast four 
automatic processes (frequency sensitivity, spatial location encoding, 
temporal information encoding, activiation of word meaning) with four 
effortal processes (facilitation of memory via imagery, mnemonics or 
elaborative devises, clustering and rehearsal). Regarding sensitivity 
to frequency of occurrence, studies were cited demonstrating that 
there was no effect on frequency judgment accuracy of incidental 
verus intentional learning conditions, practice, instructional set, 
age, and level of arousal or depression, and that there was little 
impact of individual differences on the ability to accurately estimate 
frequency of occurrence (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Several of these 
studies will be reviewed because of their central relevance to the 
present study. 
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Frequency judgments made by children from grades 2, 4, and 6 have 
been shown to be equally accurate to those made by college students, even 
when the college students are informed in advance that a frequency test 
will be given (Hasher & Chromiak, 1975). This developmental invariance 
in frequency sensitivity extends to late adulthood (Attig & Hasher, 1980; 
Kausler & Puckett, 1980). Students with significantly different SAT 
scores who do show marked differences on a memory recall test (effortful 
process) have been demonstrated to show no significant difference in 
memory for frequency of occurrence for the same items used in the recall 
test situation (Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sandft, & Rose, 1984). Frequency 
processing of learning disabled children has been demonstrated to be 
equally accurate as that of children who are proficient learners 
(Goldstein, Hasher & Stein, 1983). A final example of a variable having 
an unexpected lack of effect is that of depression, a variable often 
resulting in impairment of cognitive functions, but that has no impact 
on frequency judgments (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). 
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Findings similar to those for frequency information processing 
are cited for spatial encoding and temporal encoding, although these 
did show develomental trends that Hasher and Zacks attributed to 
task-related variables that require effortful processes. More 
recently, however, Hasher and Zacks reported results of an experiment 
that did not support the notion that temporal order encoding was 
completely automatic and the authors now subscribe to Tzeng's view that 
allows for both automatic and non-automatic aspects of temporal 
encoding (Tzeng & Cotton, 1980; Zacks, Hasher, Alba, Sandft, & Rose, 
1984). Regarding word meaning activation (an acquired automatic 
process), they marshalled evidence from dichotic listening tasks to 
show that this process occurs without awareness. They also cited the 
Stroop test literature as evidence that the interference effect of word 
meaning on color naming cannot be inhibited and that this interference 
effect continues from the early grade school years through old age, 
thus demonstrating the automaticity of word meaning activation. 
In contrast to the developmental invariance and absence of 
effects of intention or learning set, and of arousal level on automatic 
processing, effortful processing varies with numerous conditions 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1981). It has been demonstrated, for instance, that 
reliance on imagery based memory strategies increases through the 
elmentary school years, with effects of imagery on memory showing a clear 
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developmental trend. Mnemonic devices usually require instruction and 
effort and the effects of such devices on memory depends on the level 
of instruction, intention, and effort. Clustering strategies can be 
disrupted by high levels of arousal, the effects of rehearsal increase 
over the life span until old age, and can be disrupted by depression. 
In brief, Hasher and Zacks (1979) concluded that there was strong 
support in the existing literature for their model of a continuum of 
processes ranging from automatic to controlled or effortful, and for 
"the existence of a small set of basic cognitive processes that encode 
certain attributes of information directly into long-term memory 
throughout the life span and in spite of any alterations in capacity 
from stress" (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, p. 382). This position, the reader 
may remember, differs from Posner and Synder•s position that automatic 
processes have no direct impact on LTM. 
If Hasher and Zacks are correct and automatic processes, including 
automatic encoding of frequency information, exist that are capable of 
adding new information to LTM, then the outputs of these processes can 
influence decisions that a person makes in spite of the fact that the 
data are collected incidentally, that is without conscious awareness. 
For example, Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino (1977) found that mere 
frequency of occurrence plays a role in subjects' decisions about the 
truth or validity of plausible statements, such as "rice is grown in 
Flordia" or "the population of Greenland is 40 ,000." The more frequently 
a person heard these statements the more he/she felt them to be true. 
The experimenters concluded that subjects used automatically encoded 
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frequency information in making judgments of the probable truth of a 
statement. Such information would be "data driven," the result of 
processes that function independently of the intentions, interests, and 
higher abilities of the person receiving the information. These memory 
processes would function in a sharply different way than the memory 
operations involving imagery, elaboration, and retrieval plans (all 
effortful process) but, nevertheless, still have a major impact of the 
subject's final response. 
The utility of automatic processs is obvious, as they ensure 
that important information will be processed and later available to 
consciousness. They also guarantee that some fundamental aspects of 
the flow of events are stored, so that the organism can both orient 
itself in the environment, and retain the information required to learn 
from experience while, at the same time, leaving maximal attentional 
resources available for allocation to complex mental processes and 
novel events or responses (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Automatically 
encoded frequency, spatial, and temporal information also may serve an 
enabling role in retrieval of information, as in reconstructive memory 
processes. An example might be knowing that a target word was on a 
list that had been seen twice rather than on a list that had been 
presented eight times. Here, frequency information might serve as a 
retrieval cue for the targeted stimulus (Posnansky, 1978; Underwood, 
1971). 
As suggested earlier, if this model is correct it has important 
implications for understanding other aspects of cognition (Hasher & Zacks, 
1984). For instance, decision making appears to be based on affective 
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responses, and subjective probabilities that are shaped by rate of 
occurrence information (Estes, 1976; Zajonc, 1968). Developmental 
trends in such areas as category formation, word perception, and even 
sex role typing of behaviors could be examined for influences from 
frequency-based information. Finally, other cognitive processes such 
as those found in person perception (use of implicit trait schemata, 
prototype assignment, and person memory) could be conceptualized as a 
combination of specific automatic and effortful processes that operate 
along similar lines as those outlined for more basic processes (Cantor 
& Mishel, 1979). 
Much of the controversy surrounding the concept of automatic 
processing in memory involves the encoding of frequency information 
(e.g., Fisk & Schneider, 1984). Three methods have been used to study 
sensitivity for frequency of occurrence information: (a) the absolute 
judgment method, wherein subjects estimate the specific frequency that 
an item occurred in the presentation series; (b) the forced-choice or 
frequency discrimination method, wherein subjects are asked to identify 
the member of a set of stimuli that has occurred most frequently; and 
(c) the frequency ranking method, wherein a set of stimuli are rank 
ordered by the subject according to rate of occurrence. The first of 
the above methods is most commonly used. For example, subjects are 
often merely presented with a series of simple stimuli (words, pictures, 
etc.), some of which are repeated, and then asked to estimate the 
frequency of occurrence of each item. Instructions may be varied 
between groups to create various experimental conditions. For 
instance, some subjects may be asked to memorize the stimuli for a 
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recall test, or to look for a particular class of stimuli among 
distractor fillers, or to try to keep track of frequencies of a 
particular target stimulus among distractors. The typical findings of 
such experiments are that subjects make relatively accurate judgments 
across instruction conditions, with correlations of actual to estimated 
frequencies being as high as .88 (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982). 
Subjects are sensitive to differences in frequency of internal 
as well as external events (imagining the stimulus versus actual 
presentation of the stimulus) and can accurately discriminate frequency 
of these types of experiences (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Moreover, 
subjects can be highly sensitive to slight alterations in situational 
designation of the occurrence, or the unit of occurrence, for example, 
being able to rate accurately the frequency of occurrence of verbatim 
sentences imbedded in a context that includes sentences differing only 
in gist (Gude & Zechmeister, 1975). 
That frequency judgment accuracy is resilient to changes in 
subject variables and learning conditions which routinely produce major 
differences in other psychological and cognitive tasks, is an important 
empirical finding that supports the claim for automaticity of encoding 
of frequency information. As reviewed earlier, studies have 
demonstrated with high consistency that frequency of occurrence 
judgments are equally accurate in persons of different age groups, 
various levels of academic ability, differing levels of prior practice 
at making such judgments; and that this consistency is also seen within 
the same subject in conditions that would compromise other cognitive 
abilities. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that an 
automatic system for encoding occurrence rate information that has an 
impact on LTM does exist, and that the differences among and within 
individuals seen in most cognitive processes do not apply to this 
system. 
12 
Clearly, Hasher and Zacks have developed a model with impressive 
empirical support; however, recent studies have made this empirical 
base seem less secure. For instance, one study (Fisk & Schneider, 
1984) investigating automatic categorization of words showed that 
subjects could accurately categorize words and show little recognition 
for categorized words on a later test, and have no demonstrable 
retention of frequency information for the correctly categorized words. 
These results tend to contradict Hasher and Zacks' contention that 
frequency information is automatically encoded into LTM. Another 
recent set of experiments points to the limitations of Hasher and 
Zack's model in differentiating between mechanisms of encoding that may 
be automatic and retrieval mechanisms that involve intention and 
awareness. These effortful mechanisms must be active prior to making 
even automatically processed information available to the subject. If 
this is the case, no pure test of the automaticity of memory processes 
would be possible, since their effects would always be linked to those 
of effortful processes such as retrieval (Greene, 1984). Greene (1984) 
also found interference in word recall in a group of subjects under 
intentional learning conditions. No frequency information encoding was 
demonstrated by an incidental learning group in the same experiment, 
thus placing two of Hasher and Zacks' criteria in doubt in regard to 
the automaticity of encoding of frequency information. Also, as 
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mentioned above, the full automaticity of temporal encoding has been 
recently disconfirmed (Zacks, et al, 1984). 
An alternative view of memory for frequency of occurrence has 
been developed by Tvesky and Kahneman (1978). They stress the errors 
in frequency estimation that derive from the use of cognitive heuristics. 
One such heuristic is related to the availability of instances of an 
event. The availability heuristic is a cognitive process: 
for estimating the numerosity of a class, the likelihood of 
an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences, by the ease with 
which the relevant mental operations of retrieval, construction, 
or association can be performed (Tvesky & Kahneman, 1978, p. 
1128). 
This heuristic is operative at the retrieval stage of information 
processing, as compared to automatic processing theory's emphasis on 
the prior stage of information encoding. 
That the use of such a heuristic is often appropriate is based 
on the fact that, other things being equal, the instances of large 
classes of events are more available to memory than are the instances 
of smaller classes of events. Biases, however, are introduced by factors 
which affect availability differently within classes. Tvesky and 
Kahneman (1978) identify four availability biases: (a) biases due to 
the retrievability of instances; (b) biases due to the effectiveness of 
a search set; (c) biases of imaginability; and (d) illusory correlations, 
where the strength of the association between members of a stimulus pair 
influences the judgment of the frequency that the pair was presented. 
An example of this bias was noted by Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969). 
They showed that the pair long-tiger was rated as having a higher 
occurrence than lion-egg despite the fact that both pairs were actually 
presented on an identical number of trials. 
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Describing the first of these four biases, retrievability, in 
more detail will be useful here, since it bears significantly on 
self-relevancy of information, an aspect of the stimuli to be used in 
the present study. An experiment by Tvesky and Kahneman (1973) serves 
as a good example of an experimental variable independent of actual 
frequency, having significant impact on frequency estimates. In this 
experiment, familiarity was shown to significantly affect estimates of 
frequency of category occurrence. Half of the lists presented to 
subjects contained 19 names of famous females and 20 names of less 
famous males, while the remaining lists contained 19 names of famous 
males and 20 names of less famous females. Among the 90 subjects who 
estimated frequency of men and women in the presented lists, 
significantly more (80 subjects) mistakenly judged the more fame-laden 
category to be the more frequently presented gender. Familiarity of 
the name stimuli apparently affected the availability of recallable 
instances of a given gender's occurrence on the list, a finding that 
appears to be contrary to Hasher and Zacks' automatic model of 
frequency processing. 
Theoretical formulations and experiments like those of Tvesky 
and Kahneman have special relevance for the present study since it is 
possible that the estimates obtained from the subjects of events relevant 
to themselves may reflect biases related to demand characteristics, 
cognitive representation of self, salience of items to the subject, or 
some other factors not related to frequency of occurrence information. 
If this is the case, any differences observed between the experimental 
and control groups on the present study would have to be interpreted 
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in a different light, for example, by including viewpoints from a 
personality and cognitive-set perspective. At the very least, 
experimental approaches like those of Tvesky and Kahneman, Fisk and 
Schenider, and others, indicate that the controversy over the impact of 
the automatic processing theory of frequency of occurrence information 
and its relation to LTM, learning conditions, and subject variables is 
bound to continue. 
Cognitive Impairment in Alcoholics 
A recent review of the literature on cognitive impairment in 
alcoholics and other substances abusers notes that: 
To profit from psychological treatment, an individual must be 
capable of receiving new information, integrating it with 
existing stores, and then, hopefully, changing some aspect of 
his or her behavior. In recent years psychologists have 
accumulated more and more evidence that alcoholics are deficient 
in their cognitive processing (Goldman, 1983, p. 1045). 
Goldman raises the issue of how treatment might need to be modified 
when such impairment is taken into consideration. Although consistent 
patterns on intelligence tests are not found by most researchers 
(Kleinknecht & Goldstein, 1972), attention to other subject variables 
in connection with alcohol abuse has shown a consistent pattern on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale: the maintenance of performance on 
overall I. Q. and on the "hold" verbal subtests, accompanied by clear 
decline in functioning on the Block Design, Digit Symbol, and Object 
Assembly subtests (Parsons & Farr, 1981). These variables include age, 
drinking history, SES, and poly-drug use, among others. On sophisticated 
neuropsychological batteries, cognitive impairment has been even more 
consistently demonstrated (Goldman, 1983). For example, alcoholics 
score in the impaired range on both the Tactual Perception Test (visuo-
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on both the Tactual Perception Test (visuo-spatial, tactual abilities, 
and spatial memory) and the Speech Sounds Perception Test, a test of 
auditory ability (Butters & Cermak, 1980). 
In his review, Goldman traces three major themes emerging in the 
alcoholism-cognitive impairment literature. The first is a "striking 
parallel" between neuropsychological functioning of alcoholics and the 
neuropsychological functioning of elderly non-alcoholics. One aspect 
of this emergent theme is the apparent resistance to impairment of 
younger alcoholics, pointing to a "critical age" beyond which alcohol 
abuse is accompanied by the type of neuropsychological performance that 
would be more typical of chronologically older persons. This implies a 
kind of premature aging process caused by alcohol abuse that results in 
subtle brain damage that accelerates, or increases in its effect, after 
a certain age is reached (Freund, 1982; Grant, Adams, & Reed, 1980). 
Goldman's second theme is that there is a continuity of memory 
dysfunctions between Korsakoff syndrome patients and alcoholics without 
the full-blown syndrome (Butters & Cermak, 1980; Oscar-Berman, 1980). 
The finding of an apparent progression of dysfunction from normals 
through Korsakoff patients, with deficits increasing with increasing 
alcohol consumption, has been interpreted by some workers as an effect 
resulting from the relationship among drinking dose per episode, age of 
drinker, and memory function. This view posits that the progression of 
dysfunction often reported in the literature does not rest on any 
underlying neuropathological substrate but on the intercorrelations 
among these ubiquitous variables, although some studies have not 
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confirmed these confounding relationships (Macvane, Butter, Mongtomery, 
& Farber, 1982). 
The third emergent theme outlined by Goldman is related to 
localization of brain damage in alcoholics. Hypotheses have been 
advanced emphasizing damage to the right cerebreal hemisphere (Jones & 
Parsons, 1972), the frontal-limbic diencephalic system (Tarter, 1975), 
or leas localized damage that ia instead more diffuse (Wilkinson & 
Carlen, 1981). 
Two studies reported by Brandt and aaaociatea exemplify each of 
these themes (Brandt, Butters, Ryan & Bayog, 1983). Using a large number 
of alcoholic subjects divided into younger and older alcoholics, 
significant deficits in performance were demonstrated on verbal and non-
verbal short-term memory (STM) taaka when compared to non-alcoholic 
controls matched for age and education. Detoxified alcoholics were found 
to be severely impaired on the Symbol-Digit Paired-Associate Learning 
Test and on the Embedded Figures Test. This study, however, did not 
demonstrate any sparing of younger alcholics from these cognitive losses, 
a phenomenon often reported in the literature. The second study reported 
by Brandt et al. investigated recoverability. With growing consistency, 
recoverability of neuropsychological functioning during periods of 
alcohol abstinence and late in a recovery period has been demonstrated 
(Claiborn & Greene, 1981; Kish, Hagen, Woody & Harvey, 1980). With age, 
duration of alcohol abuse, and education as covariates, Brandt et al. 
found that prolonged abstinence led to better recoverability of function 
as measured by a battery of neuropsychological tests than either short-
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term or long-term abstinence. On a test of verbal STM, recoverability 
appeared to be complete in the prolonged abstinence group. Intermediate 
recovery on the same task was displayed by the long-term and short-term 
groups, which were not statistically different from each other. No 
recoverability was found for any of the groups on the Symbol-Digit 
Paired-Associate Learning Test or on the Embedded Figures Test. The 
authors noted that recoverability is not an all-or-none phenomenon. 
STM seemed to be almost completely recoverable, while LTM and tasks 
that involved encoding strategies and the ability to form new 
associations may be permanently impaired by prolonged alcohol abuse. 
This finding was interpreted by Brandt et al. in the light of the 
different areas of the brain that might be responsible for STM and LTM 
processes (cortical versus sub-cortical structures, respectively). 
This brief review clearly indicates a consensus that some 
neuropathological damage exists in alcoholics that helps to account for 
their usually poorer performance on a wide range of neuropsychological 
tasks, including those involving memory functions. If memory for 
frequency of occurrences does not follow Hasher and Zacks' model but, 
instead, follows the same kind of continuum of performance cited by 
Goldman (1983), this is reasonable to subject that alcoholics would show 
significantly lower frequency judgment performance on this kind of task 
than would non-alcoholics. The result would suggest that differences 
in frequency judgment performance are sensitive to decreases in cognitive 
capacity related to chemically induced brain dysfunction. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
The Context Study 
The present study will investigate frequency of occurrence 
phenomena in the context of a larger study designed to explore life 
situations and mood states encountered by persons during the first 90 
days after discharge from an inpatient substance abuse treatment 
facility. Investigating frequency of occurrence information in this 
context will involve fitting the typical experimental paradigm for such 
studies to the subjects, stimuli, and larger time intervals required by 
the field conditions of the larger study. Thus, it will be necessary 
to first describe the larger experimental context in which frequency of 
occurrence phenomena will be investigated. 
The larger study on which the present experiment builds was begun 
in November 1983, at Lutheran Center for Substance Abuse in Park Ridge, 
Illinois. This center is a private treatment facility associated with 
Lutheran General Hospital, located in the same northwest Chicago suburb. 
The study's purpose was to investigate patterns of recovery in treated 
alcholics by use of intensive self-report measures and structured 
interviews. In order to obtain a random sample of the recovering 
person's moods and experiences, the study utilized long-range pagers 
that were triggered randomly four times per day between the hours of 
8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., seven days per week. Subjects who were 
scheduled to be "on the beeper" for a given period were to complete a 
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Daily Activity Report each time they were paged. This report is a 
self-report measure of mood states, salient thoughts and experiences, 
situational confidence of abstinence, substance use since the last 
beep, A.A. and other self-help group activities since the last beep, 
and responses toward individuals the subject might be relating to at 
the time of the beep (Appendix A). In addition to these four, daily 
self-generated "snap-shots" of the subject's ongoing experience, each 
subject completed an End of the Day Report that summarized his/her 
perceptions of the entire day. 
Clinical subjects for this study were volunteers recruited from 
the inpatient population who met two criteria: (a) geographic ease 
of access to the center for periodic interviews and exchanges of 
experimental materials, and (b) the absence of any clinical judgment 
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on the part of the treatment team that participation would be disruptive 
of the potential subject's adjustment after discharge. Potential 
subjects excluded from recruitment due to the second criteria were 
extremely rare. Subjects were introduced to the experiment's purpose 
and methods in an information meeting, where the voluntary nature of 
their participation, confidentiality of subject information, and the 
independence of the study from the facilities treatment activities 
were emphasized. Participating subjects received a total of $50 for 
transportation and other expenses related to their participation. This 
involved two disbursements, one of $20 at discharge and a second of $30 
at the investigator's receipt of all experimental materials at the 
completion of the 90-day participation. A community sample was 
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recruited from the surrounding residential area to serve as a non-
treatment control group. These subjects received $25 at the end of 
their two-week participation. An attempt was made to obtain a 
reasonably representative sample across the age groups and SES groups 
for the comunity sample, in order to reflect the full range of 
demographic factors in the population typically served by the center. 
All subjects participated under a signed consent and all experimental 
procedures were reviewed and approved by the hospital's Human Subjects 
Committee. 
The clinical subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups. Subjects in Group I carried the pager each day for the entire 
90 days. Subjects in Group II followed the same protocol of filling 
out self-reports when paged, but carried pagers on a two weeks "on, 11 
two weeks "off" schedule. Subjects in Group III served as a clinical 
control group and did not carry a pager at any time. In addition to 
day-to-day self-reports, each group had an assigned contact schedule of 
brief biweekly, on-site interviews, and biweekly telephone contacts 
conducted by a trained, supervised research assistant. 
Subjects in Groups I and II had interviews and telephone contacts 
on a regular weekly rotating basis. Subjects in Group III were assigned 
only one telephone contact each month. The purpose of both of these 
contacts was to correct any practical difficulties related to the study 
(pager malfunctions, lost activity workbooks, etc.) and to record any 
signficant perception or experiences volunteered by the subjects that 
were related to their participation in the study, or to their recovery 
adjustment. Contacts were made in an open-ended, informal way via the 
22 
telephone and pursued more extensively in face-to-face interviews, 
although an attempt was made to avoid unnecessary probing. Subjects in 
Groups I and II also completed semi-weekly self-report measures, 
exchanged materials and arranged their next appointments during each 
biweekly visit to the facility. All subjects received a more extensive 
and structured interview at the end of their participation in the 
experiment. Several standard psychological measures were administered 
at this time as repeated measures from a larger set of inventories and 
tests administered before their discharge from treatment. 
Having briefly outlined the larger study from which this 
experiment draws its subjects and stimulus materials, it may be 
apparent as to how this context allows for the study of memory for 
frequency of occurrence. A major criterion in choosing stimulus 
materials for the present study was that they be amenable to objective 
scoring frequency. The subject's own self-generated ratings on the 
Daily Activities Reports meet this criterion and were considered 
stimuli for which frequency of occurrence estimates may be obtained. 
These estimates could then be compared to the subject's actual use of 
the response range for each item. For example, the Alert-Drowsy bipolar 
adjective item on the Daily Activity Report can be divided into three 
meaningful response ranges: (a) very, to some alert; (b) neither; and 
(c) some to very drowsy. Each subject's response to this item over two 
weeks or 90 days must fall into one of these response categories. 
Subjects can be asked to estimate the relative use of each category in 
terms of percentages, with 100% being the total number of times they 
responded to this item over the period of participation in question. 
Actual relative frequency can be computed by simply tallying the 
responses as they occur in the subject's record and computing the 
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actual relative frequencies for each category in percentages. A 
measure of accuracy or inaccuracy can then be obtained, and the several 
questions of interest to the typical study of frequency of occurrence 
studies can be asked of the data. Are the theoretically predicted 
correlations between actual and estimated relative frequencies observed? 
Does the degree of accuracy of estimates vary with subject status on 
variables known to affect other memory processes, such as abuse (present 
or absent), phase or recovery (late or early)? More generally, are the 
data consistent with the prevailing models of frequency of occurrence 
phenomena or, if inconsistent, on what basis can this inconsistency be 
explained? The present study, then, is partly exploratory in nature, 
attempting to explore well established experimental findings with novel 
data that may yield implications for clinical understanding and 
treatment issues, as well as providing evidence to support basic 
theoretical formulations regarding memory and learning. 
The Present Study 
Although frequency judgments were collected for several two-week 
intervals and for the entire 90 days of participation for subjects in 
both clinical groups, the present study is limited to an investigation 
of frequency judgments obtained at the first two-week evaluation, and 
can be seen as a preliminary to a repeated measures design or an 
investigation of judgments involving a larger time interval. 
The exploratory nature of the present study calls for an open-
ended approach to the problems presented by the several theoretical 
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perspectives that are relevant to frequency judgments and the effects 
of alcoholism on memory function. It will be possible to view the 
resulting data within the context of automatic processing theory and 
availability heuristics by emphasizing the frequency judgment aspect of 
the study. The emphasis of the grouping variables would make hypotheses 
grounded in a neuropsychological deficit view of alcoholism relevant, 
and would lead to the prediction that alcoholics will show cognitive 
impairment on frequency judgments as has been the case on some other 
measures of cognitive functioning. The following hypotheses can be 
tested, given the data to be generated from this study. Each is listed 
under the appropriate theoretical viewpoint that has lead to its 
generation. 
Automatic Processing Theory Hypotheses 
1. Relative frequency judgments and actual relative frequency of 
occurrence will be highly correlated. 
2. Actual frequency of occurrence will produce the only 
significant effect on estimates (i.e., subject variables, item salience, 
item evaluative direction, etc., will not produce significant main 
effects or interaction effects on accuracy measures). 
Cognitive Impairment Hypotheses 
3. The recovery group will have significantly lower accuracy 
scores than the control group. 
4. Recovery group subjects will perform more poorly than controls 
on judgments involving complex category judgments since the latter may 
be more sensitive to subtle deficits. This hypothesis refers to the 
different category judgments requested from subjects. The first two 
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questions required that the subject estimate the occurrence of events 
within spatial categories (i.e., extreme right or extreme left), while 
the second two questions require that the subject make a more complex 
judgment of the occurrence of events within a broader range involving 
evaluative categories (i.e., positive or negative affect). This second 
task may prove to be more sensitive to subtle cognitive deficit than 
the first task, which on inspection appears to demand a more primitive 
memory process. 
Availability of Heuristic Hypotheses 
5. Items that are rated as intuitively more salient to 
alcoholics in recovery will produce underestimation and overestimated 
effects greater than those items not judged to be salient, or abuser-
relevant items. Items can be judged as abuser-relevant by means of a 
set of independent raters, preferably persons who themselves are 
recovering abusers. These effects would be predicted from the strong 
associations related to the self-relevancy of the salient items, 
causing overestimation, and to the psychodynamic, defensive or 
repressive reaction to other salient items, resulting in 
underestimation. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The recovery group consisted of 22 persons of both genders. The 
community sample also included 22 persons of both genders. Treatment 
subjects were randomly selection Group I and Group II subjects in the 
context study. Since Group III subjects never generated the self-report 
stimuli required for the memory task, they were not included in the 
present study. All community sample subjects who completed the required 
protocol were included in the present study. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli for which judgments were made were the subjects' own 
self-ratings of their thoughts and feelings over the two-week period 
between discharge and evaluation. The actual frequency of occurrence 
of these self-generated stimuli depended ideally on several factors: 
subject compliance to the experimental protocol, the subjects' actual 
mood states and experiences, their ability to report them, and the 
demand characteristics of self-report situations such as the one the 
context study required. 
The actual stimuli are discrete markings on continuously scaled 
lines, indicating extremes from either end of a bipolar adjective or 
between high and low poles on items measuring preoccupation with eating, 
preoccupation with using, confidence of abstinence, and degree of sharing 
with others (see Appendix A). 
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Subject Estimates 
Several dependent measures were developed from subject estimates. 
Estimates were collected by means of a paper and pencil instrument titled 
"Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep" (Figure 1). The first section of 
this sheet is labeled "General Questions" and consists of four questions 
involving overall frequency judgments of all ratings over a given period. 
The first two of these questions refer to the occurrence of only the 
extreme right or left markings. The second two questions refer to the 
evaluative direction of the markings, either desirable or undesirable. 
With proud, for example, being toward the positive evaluative direction 
and on the right-hand side of the response form; while ashamed, the other 
pole of this item, being toward the negative direction and on the left-
hand side of the form. The items were randomly placed and follow no 
predetermined right-hand orientation for positive or negative evaluative 
direction. The neither category is considered to be neither positive 
nor negative in evaluation, and may simply indicate that the respondent 
did not consider the item relevant at the time of response. 
The second section entitled "Mood Questions" is formatted similarly 
to the Daily Activity Report used by the subjects throughout their 
participation, with the spatial arrangement, adjective poles, and order 
of items being the same with the exception of several items being 
completely eliminated, since they were not of experimental interest. 
All judgments requested are relative frequency judgments expressed in 
percentages. These judgments are, in fact, category judgments since a 
range of markings must be considered as a unit to make the required 
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Figure 1. Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep 
Subject ID I 
----
Date: 
-------
Check one: [] Total Period [] First 2 Weeks []Last 2 Weeks 
General Questions: 
1. What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book 
on the EXTREME RIGHT of the mood rating form? __ % 
2. What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book 
on the EXTREME LEFT of the mood rating form? __ % 
3. What percentage of the time did you mark the POSITIVE items on 
the mood rating form? __ % 
4. What percentage of the time did you mark the NEGATIVE items on 
the mood rating form? __ % 
Percentage of Responses 
Mood Questions 
very quite some neither some very quite 
0 0 0 0 
alert _% _% _% drowsy 
happy 
_% _% _% sad 
irritable 
_% _% _% cheerful 
strong 
_% _% _% weak 
angry 
_% _% _% friendly 
active 
_% _% _% passive 
lonely _% _% _% sociable 
proud 
_% _% _% ashamed 
confused _% _% _% clear 
tense _% _% _% relaxed 
Percentage (%) of Responses 
Not at all/Somewhat Quite/Verl 
How preoccupied were you with eating? 
_% _% 
How preoccupied were you with drinking/ 
using? _% _% 
How confident did you feel about your 
ability to resist the urge to drink/ 
use? _% _% 
Did you share your feelings with someone 
close to you? _% _% 
29 
judgment. The final section of the sheet consists of questions related 
to preoccupations, confidence, and sharing of feelings. Responses to 
these items are considered dichotomous for purposes of this task, since 
no "neither" category occurs. 
Procedure 
Subjects were adminisered the memory task at the end of their 
first weeks of participation in the context study. The tests were 
given at the time of the biweekly or final on-site interviews. The 
task was administered by trained research assistants following written 
instructions (Appendix B). These instructions are designed to 
highlight for the subject that he or she would be using memory rather 
than some other strategy for producing their estimates. Subjects were 
given as much time as they wanted for the task. Subjects who felt they 
could not do the task as instructed were encouraged to attempt it, but 
were excused from the task if they persisted. 
Behavioral observations were made of the subject's order of 
performing each item. When subjects clearly did not understand the 
task indicated, for example, by going beyond the 100% constraint on each 
item, or by giving patently unrealistic estimates for the most extreme 
marking categories, the experimenter pointed this out to the subject and 
would again explain the task to the subject, but without modifying the 
subject's responses. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Coding of Responses 
Responses to 14 items from the subjects' Daily Activity Reports 
(Appendix A) were recorded for purposes of the present study. The 
remaining items on the Daily Actvity Reports were dropped because they 
were not of interest to the present study, either because they were not 
codable for relative frequencies, or because their inclusion would have 
made the memory task unreasonably time consuming for the subjects. The 
14 items of interest were of two kinds: mood items and non-mood items. 
The mood items will be described first, followed by a description of 
the non-mood items. 
The mood item consisted of 10 pairs of adjectives describing mood 
states or states of arousal. The 10 pairs of adjectives were: alert-
drowsy, happy-sad, irritable-cheerful, strong-weak, angry-friendly, 
active-passive, lonely-sociable, proud-ashamed, confused-clear, and 
tense-relaxed. The adjective pairs were arranged on the Daily Activity 
Report so that 5 of the 10 adjectives were a positive connotation (as 
intuitively defined by the researchers) were on the left-hand side of 
the form, while the other 5 were on the right-hand side, thus forcing 
the adjectives with different connotations to be balanced for right-left 
placement. The 10 adjectives with a positive connotation were: alert, 
happy, cheerful, strong, friendly, active, sociable, proud, clear and 
These adjective will hereafter be referred to collectively as positives. 
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The 10 negative adjectives were: drowsy, sad, irritable, weak, angry, 
passive, lonely, confused and tense. These adjectives will hereafter 
be referred to collectively as negatives. 
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Adjectives within a pair were separated on the Daily Activity 
Report by seven scale markers. This allowed the subjects to indicate a 
mood state on any given item by checking the marker that indicated to 
what extent (very, quite, some, neither) they were experiencing a given 
mood (as described by an adjective) at the time of the beep. The 
response marker indicating that the subject experienced neither the 
positive nor negative mood state described by an adjective pair was 
located in the middle column of the Daily Activity Report mood section, 
between the two defining adjective poles. Responses on all 10 mood 
items that reflected subjects' use of this middle marker will be 
referred to as neithers when discussed collectively in the remaining 
text. 
Coding of the mood items involved assigning values to each 
response marker depending on its right-left placement on the bipolar 
scale. From right to left responses were coded 6, 5, 4, O, 3, 2, 1. 
This coding scheme was adopted so that means for mood states could be 
calculated for certain analyses (for example, an analysis to determine 
if the average intensity of a mood state was related to accuracy). 
Subjects were allowed only one response per bipolar item. 
Responses falling between two markers were assigned to the nearest 
response category. Responses that were exactly between categories were 
assigned to the next higher category. Cases when more than one 
response was made to an item on a given beep, or to which no response 
was made, were coded as missing. 
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The non-mood items of interest to the present study consisted of 
four questions: (1) How preoccupied were you with eating? (2) How 
preoccupied were you with drinking/using? (3) How confident did you feel 
about your ability to resist the urge to drink/use? (4) Did you share 
your feelings with someone close to you? Collectively, these questions 
will be referred to as non-mood items. Individually, they will be 
referred to (in order listed above) as preoccu. eat, preoccu. using, 
confident-resist, and shared. 
Responses to the non-mood items were made by the subject on a 
pre-coded line on the Daily Activity Report form. Markers on the line 
were numbered from 0 to 9, moving from left to right, and indicated 
responses to a given question from "not at all" to "very much. 11 This 
coding scheme was maintained for data analysis. The same conventions 
used on the mood items for handling responses between markers and for 
multiple responses to an item on a single beep were also used for 
non-mood i terns. 
Compliance 
The research protocol called for each subject to be beeped four 
times a day for two weeks. For the purposes of the present study, this 
meant that a perfect compliance to the protocol would result in 784 
responses across items for each subject, or 56 responses to each 
individual item over the 14-day period. Compliance varied little from 
item to item; subjects rarely completed only some of the items of 
interest on the Daily Activity Report without completing others. 
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Because of this consistency. the number of responses to the first mood 
item, alert-drowsy, was used as an index of overall compliance. The 
control group responded to this item an average of 44.2 times with a 
standard deviation of 12.8. The recovery group responded to this item 
an average of 47.8 times with a standard deviation of 11.8. The control 
group's average compliance was 79% of perfect compliance, while the 
recovery group's average was 86% of the same protocol goal. The 
difference between the two groups on this measure of compliance was not 
significant when tested with a two-tailed! test, 1 (44) = .928. 
Construction and Description of Relative Frequencies 
Subjects' actual responses for the 14 days of participation were 
tallied within ranges defined by the judgments required by the Memory 
Task. Percentages were then calculated for the number of actual 
responses falling into each range from the total number of responses to 
a given item. This resulted in relative frequencies for each item, 
expressed in percentages, corresponding to the ranges specified in the 
Memory Task. 
The means and standard deviations of the subjects' relative 
frequencies for each group and for each item appear in Table 1. 
Collectively, these relative frequencies of responses on the Daily 
Activity Reports expressed in percentages will be referred to as 
frequencies. The term frequency will be used where context makes this 
usage grammatically appropriate. 
In investigating frequencies, ~ tests were used as a way of 
describing group differences. Since no hypotheses were entertained in 
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Table 1 
Mean Freguency by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 69.7 23.0 79.4 13.7 
Happy 64.3 20 .1 63.8 20.2 
Strong 41.0 30.8 55.2 23.5 
Active 49.6 27.3 59.3 18.6 
Proud 33.4 28.2 49.4 26.9 
Cheerful 51.1 23.6 57.2 18 .9 
Friendly 58.6 24.0 58.4 18.6 
Sociable 50.0 22.9 52 .1 21.9 
Clear 61.5 33.3 63.6 21.8 
Relaxed 58.5 27 .8 45.8 25.6 
Neithers Controls Recovery P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 4.5 5.2 3.0 4.6 
Happy/Sad 24.8 18.3 18. 1 15.5 
Irritable/Cheerful 27.4 21.5 18.8 12.9 
Strong/Weak 43.1 32.4 25.8 23.4 * 
Angry/Friendly 30.8 23.4 20.9 17 .5 
Active/Passive 22.5 27.7 13.4 13.7 
Lonely/Sociable 32.1 25.1 17.9 18. 1 • 
Proud/Ashamed 62.7 31.4 37.1 27 .5 ** 
Confused/Clear 26.9 31.5 14.9 13.9 
Tense/ Relaxed 19. 1 19.9 12.8 19.0 
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Table 1 - Continued 
Mean Frequency by Test Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Negatives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Angry 10.6 7.4 20.7 14.8 • 
Irritable 21.4 10. 1 23.9 15.5 
Lonely 17.9 20.3 20.0 20.6 
Confused 11.6 10.8 21.6 15.9 • 
Tense 22.3 17. 1 41.4 21. 7 •• 
Drowsy 25.8 20.2 17.6 14. 1 
Sad 11.0 9.2 18. 1 16.9 
Weak 15.9 15.5 19.0 13.4 
Passive 27.8 17.3 27 .3 18.5 
Ashamed 3.9 5.7 13.4 12. 7 
Non-Mood Items Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 5.7 6.5 7.4 10.3 
Preoccu. Using 2.6 5.3 5. 1 9.0 
Confident-Resist. 94.5 8.4 88.3 19.5 
Shared 14.0 14.7 3.3 28.3 •• 
NOTE: n = 22 for all group means • 
• p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
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the represent study for group differences on frequencies, the statistical 
test is used descriptively, not in a hypothesis testing mode. Because 
of this descriptive use of statistics that are often used for hypothesis 
testing, each use is described as either descriptive or hypothesis 
testing as it appears in the text. 
Descriptive comparisons between groups on frequencies resulted in 
eight significant differences based on a two-tailed ! test, as reported 
in Table 1. The recovery group was significantly higher on frequencies 
of angry, confused, tense, ashamed, and shared. The control group had 
significantly higher frequencies of lonely-sociable, proud-ashamed, and 
strong-weak. When considered from the point of view of evaluative 
direction, significant differences between groups appeared on negatives 
and neithers, but not on positives. The recovery group had significantly 
higher mean frequencies of responses on 4 of the 10 negative items. 
For all of the 10 bipolar items, the control group had higher mean 
frequencies than the recovery group for neithers, although the 
differences were significant only in the cases of strong-weak, lonely-
sociabl e, and proud-ashamed. Of the four non-mood items, only share 
showed a significant difference, such that the recovery group mean was 
higher than the control group mean. 
The groups were not significantly different on any of the items 
that probe preoccupation with eating and drinking and confidence of 
ability to resist using. Although the recovery group means were higher 
for both types of preoccupation, lower for confidence in ability to 
resist using, these differences were not significant. 
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Description of Estimates 
Subjects' estimates of their actual relative frequencies were 
recorded on the Memory Task form. No estimates were missing, and no 
subject rejected the task. For all subjects, each item tallied to the 
100% total required by the task, indicating that the subjects understood 
at least this part of the task and could correctly make calculations 
required to ensure the 100% total. 
The means and standard deviations of the subjects' estimates of 
their actual relative frequencies by group and by item appear in Table 
2. Collectively, these variables will be referred to as estimates. 
Inspection of a bivariate x-y scatterplot of estimates revealed that 
subjects tended to frame their estimates in rounded numbers; that is, 
in terms of multiples of 5 and 10. Descriptive univariate comparisons 
by means of two-tailed t tests resulted in the significant differences 
reported in Table 2. The recovery group made significantly higher 
estimates on all the negative items. No significant differences were 
found between groups on the positive items. Only one neither category 
difference reached significance (proud-ashamed), with the control group 
subjects estimating themselves as higher than recovery subjects. Of 
the remaining four daily responses, only one difference proved to be 
significant, such that the recovery group subjects' estimates were 
significantly higher on preoccu. using. 
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Table 2 
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 69.2 24.0 69.7 25.6 
Happy 67.6 31.2 62.6 29.8 
Strong 48.2 36.2 54.3 31.5 
Active 58.5 32.4 62.1 27.2 
Proud 33.0 35.0 52.6 36.2 
Cheerful 62.6 29.9 59.1 29.7 
Friendly 70.6 29.3 61.5 28.7 
Sociable 64.1 33.09 53.0 29.4 
Clear 71.6 31.3 63.9 30.3 
Relaxed 58.1 33.4 45.8 33.8 
Neithers Controls Recovery P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 7. 1 9.8 17.7 23 .1 
Happy/Sad 22.6 30.8 21.2 28.7 
Irritable/Cheerful 22.5 28.0 18.7 22.7 
Strong/Weak 38.5 37.4 26.7 33.5 
Angry/Friendly 21.0 28.7 17 .1 22.9 
Active/Passive 22.8 33.7 17.3 23.8 
Lonely I Sociable 22.0 29.8 18.9 29.1 
Proud/Ashamed 61.8 38.2 34.5 37.4 * 
Confused/Clear 24.2 29.5 15 .1 18.7 
Tense/Relaxed 20.7 19.8 41.3 32.0 
Table 2 - Continued 
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Controls 
M SD 
Angry 8.5 7.9 
Irritable 14.9 15.5 
Lonely 13.9 18.4 
Confused 8.4 11. 5 
Tense 20.7 19.8 
Drowsy 23.5 19.6 
Sad 9.6 10.3 
Weak 13.4 14.2 
Passive 18. 7 16.9 
Ashamed 2.5 4.7 
Non-Mood Items Controls 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 10.2 16.2 
Preoccu. Using 2.5 4.5 
Confident-Resist. 62.1 47.8 
Shared 26.8 26.4 
NOTE: n = 22 for all group means • 
• p < .05. 
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Group 
Recovery P Level 
M SD 
23.5 25.4 tt 
22.2 25.2 
27.6 25.0 tt 
21.0 22.4 
* 
41.3 32.0 * 
16.3 19.2 
16. 1 18.3 
19.0 16.3 
20.6 19 .1 
12.8 18.5 * 
Recovery P Level 
M SD 
20.2 30.0 
16.8 27.5 * 
61.0 41.8 
43 .1 31.9 
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Measures of Accuracy 
Before describing individual measures of accuracy, the concept 
of accuracy will be explored more specifically so that different 
operational definitions can be viewed from their respective 
underpinnings. The literature on memory for frequency of occurrences 
describes two types of accuracy: absolute accuracy and relative 
accuracy. Absolute accuracy measures how much a subject's estimates 
differ from the actual frequency of occurrence. In the present study, 
difference score measures reflect this kind of accuracy. Relative 
accuracy measures how well a subject can distinguish higher rates of 
occurrence from lower rates of occurrence. The present study uses 
correlational measures to assess relative accuracy. Other measures of 
relative accuracy, such as rank ordering of targets for frequency, are 
sometimes used in studies of memory for frequency of occurrence, but 
were not used in the present study. Measures of relative accuracy may 
not agree with measures of absolute accuracy. This is because consistent 
underestimation or overestimation may still lead to high correlation of 
actual frequency with estimates; that is, consistent distortions may 
result in high discrimination between items on frequency of occurrence. 
A measure that reflects absolute accuracy is the number of hits. 
A hit is defined as success in reaching a specified (actual) range of 
frequency. Hit measures will be described at greater length below. 
Measures can be developed that reflect both kinds of accuracy, for 
example, when absolute differences between actual and estimated are used 
to rank order the accuracy of judgments. 
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To answer the question as to whether two individuals or groups of 
individuals are more or less accurate in their estimates, both types of 
accuracy described above must be considered. In the present study, 
several dependent measures were derived from frequencies and estimates. 
These included hit measures, correlation measures and difference scores. 
The definition of each measure, the kind of accuracy it reflects, and 
its analysis are discussed under separate headings below. Since there 
are several variables that are used to measure accuracy, and the measures 
may lead to conflicting findings, a brief review of the evidence for 
between group differences on each type of measure will be made at the 
end of each subheading. 
Hit Scores 
Hits were calculated using the differences between each frequency 
and its estimate. An estimate was clasified as a hit when the absolute 
difference from its actual frequency was within a specified range. 
Decreasing this range increases the level of accuracy needed to score a 
hit. An analogy to events at an archery range may help make the use of 
the hit measure clear. A subject making frequency judgments may be 
compared to an archer attempting to accurately fire arrows at a target. 
Individual judgments can be compared to individual trials at hitting 
the bull's eye. As the rings painted around the target's center help to 
establish how close an arrow has come to the archer's goal, various 
criteria for a hit within certain ranges of accuracy help to define how 
accurately a subject has estimated actual rates of occurrence. 
Hit measures reflect absolute accuracy rather than relative accuracy 
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alone. Since a hit can occur by chance alone (the chance rate of 
occurrence depending on the absolute number that defines a hit, or the 
width of a ring to follow the above analogy) the binomial test can be 
used to determine if subject can achieve hits at a rate significantly 
higher than chance. By defining various criteria for a hit, each 
requiring increased accuracy, a ceiling definition can be found, above 
which subjects cannot achieve hits at a rate higher than that expected 
by chance. 
Results on the binomial tests cross groups and by groups for four 
hit measures, defined by increasing levels of accuracy (plus or minus 
10%, 5%, 2.5% and 1%), are reported in Table 3, along with the actual 
number of trials (judgments) and successes (hits). For subjects across 
groups, hits occurred at a significantly higher rate than that expected 
by chance, until a hit was defined as plus or minus 1%. For the groups 
taken separately, the ceiling above which hits could not be made above 
the chance expectation was plus or minus 2.5% for each group. The lower 
ceiling definition for the groups taken separately is probably due to 
the reduction in the number of trials. 
It is likely that the probabilities assigned to chance occurrences 
of hits in these binomial tests are in error, due to the fact that each 
trial is not independent of other trials. Whatever miscalculation that 
may be involved, however, is probably consistent for both groups and for 
all hit measures, and does not invalidate the rationale for looking for 
a ceiling of accuracy, or group differences on such measures. 
Table 3 
Hit Measures by Group. 
Definition 
Range +10 +5 
Chance 
Proability .2 • 1 
Groups 
Control Group 
Total Hits 415** 263** 
Mean Hits 18.9 12.0 
Recovery Group 
Total Hits 383** 248** 
Mean Hits 17 .4 11.3 
Combined Groups 
Total Hits 798** 511** 
Mean Hits 18. 1 11. 7 
Note: •• p < .01, binomial probability. 
+2.5 
.05 
167 
7.6 
155 
1.0 
322** 
7.3 
+1.0 
.02 
104 
4.7 
89 
4.0 
193 
4.4 
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! tests were conducted between groups for hits defined according 
to the various criteria. Since specific hypotheses were entertained 
concerning hit measures; these! tests are to be considered hypothesis 
testing in nature. No two-tailed tests reached significance. Under 
the cognitive deficit hypothesis that recovery group subjects should 
achieve fewer hits than control group subjects, one significant 
difference was found when a hit was defined a plus or minus 2.5%, t = 
1.66 (42); Q < .05. On each of the other three hit measures, the 
recovery group showed a lower mean hit rate than did the control group, 
although these differences did not reach significance. 
Judging from the evidence from hit measures, which reflect absolute 
accuracy, subjects in both groups can accurately estimate the rate of 
occurrence of their mood states. Some evidence was found for the 
cognitive impairment hypothesis that recovery subjects would be less 
accurate at the task than are control subjects; the one significant 
difference required the use of a specific one-tailed hypothesis. 
Difference Scores 
Difference scores were derived by subtracting each estimate from 
its corresponding frequency. Both signed differences and absolute values 
of differences were used to investigate group performance. Table 4 
presents the means and standard deviations of each signed difference 
variable by group. Table 5 presents the same information for the absolute 
difference scores. Although difference scores are dependent measures, 
hypothesis testing by means of univariate tests were not conducted, due 
to the large number of comparisons. The t tests described here are to 
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Table 4 
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 0.4 16.5 9.7 21.0 
Happy 
-3.3 22.7 1.2 18.6 
Strong o. 72 24.7 1.2 18.6 
Active -8.9 19 .6 -2.8 19.9 
Proud 0.3 20.7 -3.2 17.7 
Cheerful 11.6 18.6 -1.9 18.6 
Friendly -12.1 21.8 -3.0 18.2 
Sociable -14.2 23.5 -0.9 20.8 
Clear -10.1 22.1 -0.3 17. 1 
Relaxed -0.4 19.6 o.o 17.7 
Neithers Controls Recovery P Level 
Alert/Drowsy -2.6 9.4 -14.6 21.8 
Happy/Sad 2.2 23.7 -3.2 19.5 
Irritable/Cheerful 4.9 17 .3 0 .1 17 .6 
Strong/Weak 4.6 23.6 -0.9 17.5 
Angry I Friendly 9.8 19.8 3.7 14.8 
Active/Passive -0.3 14.2 -3.8 16.3 
Lonely/Sociable 10. 1 19.6 -1.0 23.7 
Proud/Ashamed 0.9 26 .8 2.6 20.8 
Confused/ Cl ear 2.7 22.0 -0.3 12. 7 
Tense/Relaxed -2.1 24.7 -0 .1 13.6 
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Table 4 - Continued 
Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Negatives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Angry 2. 1 6.7 -2.7 20.0 
Irritable 6.6 12.9 1. 7 20.1 
Lonely 4.0 13.6 2.3 14.6 
Confused 3.2 11.8 0.6 14. 1 
Tense 1. 7 16.5 0. 1 21. 7 
Drowsy 2.4 15.0 1.3 10.4 
Sad 1.3 10.5 2.0 9. 1 
Weak 2.6 9.8 o.o 14.2 
Passive 9 .1 12.3 6.6 16.4 
Ashamed 1.4 4.0 .06 12.4 
Non-Mood Items Controls Recovery X Level 
M SD M SD 
Preoccu. Eating -4.6 15.4 -12.9 25.4 
Preoccu. Using 0 .1 5.8 -11. 7 22.6 • 
Confident-Resist. 32.4 51.6 27 .2 40.0 
Shared -12.8 25.9 -9.8 37.2 
NOTE: n = 22 for all group means • 
• p < .05. 
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Table 5 
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item Group 
Positives Controls Recovery P Level 
M SD M SD 
Alert 13.0 9.7 16.4 16.1 
Happy 18.0 13.5 14.9 10.7 
Strong 17.8 18.31 15.2 10. 1 
Active 14.7 15.5 16.4 11 • 0 
Proud 15.3 13.5 13.8 11.2 
Cheerful 16.9 13 .6 14.0 12.0 
Friendly 19.9 14.6 13.8 11.8 
Sociable 20.8 17 .5 16 .1 12. 7 
Clear 15.7 18.3 13 .5 10. 1 
Relaxed 15.2 11.8 14.4 9.8 
Neithers Controls Recovery P Level 
Alert/Drowsy 6.0 7.6 15.4 21.2 
Happy/Sad 18.8 13.9 14.8 12.8 
Irritable/Cheerful 14.6 9.9 13.4 11.0 
Strong/Weak 17 .6 16.0 12.3 12.2 
Angry/Friendly 17.7 12.8 10 .1 11.3 ti 
Active/Passive 10.6 9.2 10 .6 12.8 
Lonely/Sociable 16.7 14. 1 16.4 16.7 
Proud/Ashamed 18.2 19.2 16.8 12.0 
Confused/Clear 15.5 15.5 7.9 9.8 
Tense/Relaxed 17.3 17.3 8.3 10.7 
Table 5 - Continued 
Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group 
Item 
Negatives Controls 
M SD 
Angry 5.5 4.2 
Irritable 11.0 9.2 
Lonely 7.6 11.9 
Confused 8.0 9. 1 
Tense 12.0 11. 1 
Drowsy 11 .o 10.2 
Sad 7.8 6.9 
Weak 7.5 6.7 
Passive 10.6 11 • 0 
Ashamed 2.3 3.5 
Non-Mood Items Controls 
M SD 
Preoccu. Eating 7.9 13.9 
Preoccu. Using 2.9 5.0 
Confident-Resist. 40.2 45.5 
Shared 20.6 19.9 
NOTE: n = 22 for all group means • 
• p < .05. 
Group 
Recovery 
M SD 
13.0 15. 1 
13. 1 15.0 
12.3 7.6 
9.6 10. 1 
16.9 13.0 
8.4 6 .1 
7.4 5.5 
10.9 8.7 
15. 1 8.7 
9.4 7.7 
Recovery 
M SD 
14.3 24.5 
12.5 22.2 
28.2 39.4 
27.0 26.8 
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be viewed as descriptive in nature. The .!:. tests comparing the groups on 
difference scored yielded the signficant differences reported in Tables 
4 and 5. 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 were developed to show the relationship among 
frequencies, estimates, absolute differences and signed differences. 
The plots are organized by the evaluative content of 1i100G item~,. FaC'h 
f5 t_\it·~ repr·e~.er.tf:' tli!-! 1 G mood items along a single evaluative 
dimension: positive, negative, or neither. Bars represent mean 
frequency by group. Unconnected large dots represent mean estimates by 
group. Lines plot the level of absolute differences by group for each 
variable. Frequencies and estimates are plotted on the outer scale of 
the figures, which range from 0 to 100 percent. Hean signed differences 
are reflected in the distance from the end of a bar (mean frequency) 
and the unconnected dot (mean estimate) for each group. An estimate 
dot appearing above a group frequency bar indicates that the group on 
the average overestimated the frequency of that item, and had a 
negative mean signed difference. An estimate dot in a bar indicates 
underestimation, and a positive mean signed difference. 
These figures demonstrate that both groups tend to overestimate 
positives (Figure 2) and underestimate negatives (Figure 4). Descriptive 
.!:. tests of mean over·estimction ancl mean underestimation across all 10 
items by evaluative direction, led to a trend toward significant 
differences between groups on overestimation of positives, such that 
the control group overestimated positive moods more than the recovery 
group (.!:. (42) = 1.82, p < .07). Other measures of underestimation or 
Figure 2. Positive Hood Items 
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Figure 4. Negative Hood Items 
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overestimation did not approach significance. 
Inspection of the levels of absolute differences across the three 
figures shows that the recovery group is more acurate than the control 
group on the positive scale and on the neither scale, but is less 
accurate than the control group on the negative scale. While both 
groups exhibit extreme variations in mean absolute differences on 
negatives, these changes are less pronounced on positives and neithers. 
Also, the recovery group mean absolute difference is relatively stable 
in elevation across the free figures, whereas the control group's mean 
is very different in elevation on the figure for negatives than it is 
on the other two figures. The control group's accuracy, then, appears 
more sensitive to evaluative direction that the recovery group's 
accuracy, which is more stable across evaluative directions. 
These relationships were further investigated by calculating each 
individual's mean absolute accuracy for each evaluative direction, thus 
creating three composite accuracy variables: mean accuracy on positives, 
mean accuracy on negatives, and mean accuracy on neithers. 
Both groups had the same rank ordering of acuracy for the three 
mean absolute accuracy measures. In order of descending accuracy, this 
rank ordering was most accurate on negatives, less accurate on neithers, 
and least accurate on positives. When t tests were conducted between 
groups for each mean absolute accuracy measure, the only difference to 
reach significance was that for negative items, with the control group 
being significantly more accurate than the recovery group, ! (44) = 2.4, 
p < .04. The evidence, therefore, from these measures is that the control 
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group is more accurate than the recovery group, but that this difference 
surfaces only when the evaluative direction of items is considered (a t 
test betwen groups on mean absolute accuracy across all three types of 
item was not significant). 
In summary, the evidence from difference scores points to an 
interaction of group status, evaluative direction and accuracy. Recovery 
subjects appear to be relatively invariant in their accuracy. Although 
showing the same overestimation and underestimation effects that are 
seen in the control group's scores, the recovery group's scores show 
less systematic inaccuracy. In fact, control group subjects overestimate 
the occurrence of positive mood states significantly more than do 
recovery subjects, making them less accurate as measured by absolute 
differences on positive and mood items. The control group, however, 
shows higher accuracy on negative mood items. The recovery group 
subjects also show higher accuracy on negative mood items relative to 
the other evaluative dimensions, but not as dramatically as do the 
control subjects. 
Discrimination Coefficients 
A measure of accuracy of estimates sometimes used in studies of 
memory for frequency of occurrences is the discrimination coefficient 
(Flexer & Bower, 1975). A correlation coefficient is calculated between 
the subject's true and judged frequencies. The result is a measure of 
relative accuracy, rather than absolute accuracy, reflecting how well 
subject responses distinguish one rate of frequency from another. An r 
to..;' transformation is necessary if the resulting correlations are not 
normally distributed. Since many of the discrimination coefficients 
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for subjects in the present study were in the high .90s and some 
approached 1.0, transformations were made of all coefficients using the 
Fisher.!: to..!' formula (Hays, 1973). 
Overall discrimination coefficients. Discrimination coefficients 
based on frequencies and estimates for all 34 daily response items were 
calculated. Table 6 contains summary statistics for this measure by 
group under the row for all. Other measures in this table are 
discrimination coefficients that have been computed on frequency and 
estimate pairs other than all 34 judgments and will be described below. 
Each measure is followed in Table 6 by the summary statistics for its 
corresponding z' transformed scores. 
Table 6 
Discrimination Coefficients by Group. 
Pairs 
All 
All (.,!') 
Positives 
Positives (.,!') 
Negatives 
Negatives (.,!') 
Neithers 
Neithers (.,!') 
Hood Only 
Hood Only (~' ) 
Controls 
H SD 
• 79 .12 
1.17 .39 
• 72 .23 
1.10 .59 
.61 .35 
.99 • 78 
• 74 .30 
1.23 • 71 
.83 • 15 
1. 41 .66 
Group 
Recovery 
M SD 
• 78 • 15 
1.19 .49 
.56 .27 
• 71 .41 
.62 .33 
.90 .62 
.48 .31 
.68 .61 
.80 .18 
1.31 .59 
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The discrimination coefficients for each group averaged in the high 
.70s. Neither the! test between groups on the original correlations, 
nor on the .!.' transformations reached significance. Across judgments 
the two groups are very similar in their accuracy as measured by the 
discrimination coefficients. Since both groups were less accurate in 
their estimates of the non-mood items than of the mood items, as reflected 
in absolute differences discussed above, discrimination coefficients 
were calculated based only on the 30 mood items. The resulting 
coefficients were higher, indicating higher accuracy, but the difference 
between groups was still not significant. 
Evaluative-content-based discrimination coefficients. To 
investigate the possibility that evaluative direction might be 
interacting with group status and level of frequency to affect accuracy, 
two additional discrimination coefficients were constructed: one 
reflecting accuracy on negative items only, and another reflecting 
accuracy on positive items only. The control group showed significantly 
higher relative accuracy on positive items, ! (42) = 2.53, p < .02. 
For negatives, however, the control group was slightly and non-
significantly more accurate. 
These differences again suggest a group by evaluative direction 
interaction for accuracy. The control group is significantly more 
accurate on relative measures of accuracy on positives and neithers, but 
the recovery group has more relative accuracy on negatives. The reader 
will recall that the situation was reversed for absolute accuracy. The 
recovery group had higher absolute accuracy on positives and neithers 
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as measured by mean absolute difference scores, while the control group 
had significantly higher absolute accuracy on negatives. Together, 
these measures of accuracy suggest that although both groups 
systematically overestimated positives and underestimated negatives 
(resulting in lowered absolute accuracy), the control group was 
generally more accurate when both types of accuracy were taken into 
consideration. 
In review of the findings on discrimination coefficients, it is 
clear that both groups show high relative accuracy when accuracy across 
all items on the Memory Task are considered. This overall accuracy 
improves if only the mood items are used to assess accuracy. Group 
differences on overall measures of accuracy were not significant. When 
discrimination coefficients were constructed on single evaluative 
dimensions, however, clear group differences did emerge. The control 
group showed significantly higher accuracy on both the neither items 
and the positive items. 
Spatial and Evaluative Category Judgments 
The description and analysis of variables related to the General 
Questions Section of the Memory Task are discussed separately in this 
section because they are different in kind than the other 34 judgments 
made by each subject. All of the judgments in the present study are in 
a sense category judgments: they all required the subject to sum 
frequencies over response ranges on the Daily Activity Reports. The 
judgments discussed in this section, however, require summing frequencies 
not only across response ranges, but across mood items, using categories 
not previously introduced explicitly to the subject in the context study. 
58 
For example, in order to estimate the percent of responses that occurred 
on the extreme right-hand side of the Daily Activity Reports, the 
subject must use information for all 10 mood items. In addition, the 
subjects were never asked to attend specifically to the right-left 
placement of their responses. This judgment, then, requires the 
subject to sum across items and to judge the frequency of implicit 
events, such as right-left placement. 
Four categories that were not explicitly introduced in the context 
study were introduced in the General Questions Section of the Memory 
Task. The first two questions requested judgments of the frequency of 
markings made by the subject on each spatial extreme ror all mood items. 
The second two questions requested judgments of the frequency of 
markings in the categories of positive and negative described to the 
subject at the time of the administration of the Memory Task. The 
spatial category judgments were hypothesized to be less difficult than 
the evaluative category judgments. Group differences were hypothesized 
to be more likely to emerge on the evaluative category judgments. 
Description of relative frequencies. The relative frequencies for 
the first two questions dealing with extreme left and right placement 
of responses were expressed as percentages of extreme left-hand (left) 
and extreme right-hand (right) responses of the total of all mood item 
responses. The relative frequencies for the second two questions dealing 
with evaluative direction of responses were calculated by taking the 
mean of each subject's relative frequencies for positive items (good) 
and the mean of each subject's relative frequencies for negative items 
(bad). The means and standard deviations for these variables and the 
59 
resulting difference scores appear in Table 7, below. 
Table 7 
Spatial and Evaluative Category Judgment Variables 
Variable Group 
Controls Recovery 
M SD M SD 
Frequencies 
Right 6.9 11.5 9.5 9.8 
Left 6.7 10.6 7.5 8.9 
Good 53.8 19.4 58.4 16.6 
Bad 16.8 8.2 23.3 13.5 
Estimates 
Right 13.2 12.3 16.6 15.4 
Left 14.6 12.9 23.9 23.7 
Good 66 .1 18.0 61.4 22.5 
Bad 23.6 14.2 31.5 17.1 
Signed Differences 
Right -6.5 9 .1 -9 .1 14.7 
Left -7 .8 9.0 -14.3 17.9 
Good -12.3 22.1 -2.9 15.7 
Bad -6.8 12. 7 -8.2 13 .9 
Absolute Differences 
Right 7.5 8.3 12 .1 12.2 
Left 8.6 8.1 15.0 17.2 
Good 1.5 16.9 13.2 8.7 
Bad 11.4 8.6 13.4 8.8 
Description of estimates. Subject responses to questions 1 
through 4 in the General Questions were used without coding or 
transformation. The means and standard devisions of these variables 
are included in Table 7. Two-tailed t tests between groups on these 
variables yielded no significant differences. 
Dependent measures: difference scores. Discrimination 
coefficients for individual subjects were not used due to the small 
number of judgments involved. Hit measures were not developed due to 
the small number of trials making the binomial test unsuitable for 
reaching any conclusions about relative performance. Instead, 
difference scores were used to assess accuracy. 
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Difference scores on category judgments were computed by 
subtracting the frequency from the estimate for each judgment. The 
absolute value of each difference was used as a separate variable. 
Means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in Table 
7. None of the group differences were significant using two-tailed t 
tests at the .05 confidence level. 
Both groups overestimated frequency on all four questions. This 
may be related to the absence of any constraint on these judgments; 
that is, unlike any of the other judgments for the present study, the 
judgments in the General Questions Section are not directly linked to 
other judgments. Even taken in pairs of spatial and evaluative judgments, 
they do not have to (and probably should not) tally to 100%. The groups 
were very similar in accuracy with the only trend toward a significant 
difference being revealed in a summed score for absolute accuracy on 
spatial judgments (combined accuracy on qustions 1 and 2), !. (42) = 
1.84, .£ = .074, with the control group being more accurate. 
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When t tests for correlated means were performed between each 
group's accuracy score on spatial judgments and the same group's 
accuracy score on evaluative judgments, differences between these kinds 
of judgments are suggested. For the control group, significantly less 
accuracy was displayed on evaluative judgments than on spatial judgments 
(!. (21) = 2.39, .£ < .03). For the recovery group, however, there was 
no significant difference in accuracy for these two types of judgments, 
as measured by summed composite scores. 
In summary, the evidence by means of difference scores on accuracy 
of spatial and evaluative category judgments weakly supports the 
hypothesized relationships. There was a non-signficant trend toward 
the control group being more accurate on spatial judgments. The control 
group was more accurate on spatial judgments than on evaluative 
judgments as predicted, but this was not true of the recovery subjects. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that group differences would emerge on 
evaluative judgments, both groups performed relatively poorly on 
evaluative category judgments; although the control group was more 
accurate, this difference was not significant. 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
Different theoretical perspectives were used to generate the 
hypotheses tested in the present study. These hypotheses required 
assumptions that at points directly contradict the assumptions of other 
hypotheses. Because of the absence of a unified theoretical perspective, 
each hypothesis formulated in Chapter II will be discussed separately 
in the present section. Each specific hypothesis is presented 
(sometimes in abreviated form) in bold type, followed by a discussion 
of the related findings. The second subsection below discusses the 
results integratively across hypotheses, along with implications for 
the different theories of memory for frequency of occurrences. A 
critique subsection follows, discussing the limitations of the present 
study, as well as threats to its internal and external validity. The 
final subsection suggests directions for future research in the area of 
memory for frequency of occurrences. 
Specific Hypotheses 
Automatic Processing Hypotheses 
1. Relative trequency estiaates and actual relative trequency ot 
occurrence will be highly correlated. Strong support was found for 
this hypothesis. Observed correlations were comparable to those 
reported in other memory for frequency of occurrence studies. For some 
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single evaluate dimensions, some subjects obtained correlations over 
.99. Hit measures and difference scores provided strong evidence for 
high absolute accuracy, in addition to the high relative accuracy. 
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A possible alternative hypothesis that may lead to reservations 
about interpreting this high correspondence of estimates to actual 
frequency as support for automatic processing of Crequency information 
is that it may, in part, be related to the 100% restraint on the 
majority of the judgments. Although it was demonstrated that the high 
correlations between frequency and estimates were not solely due to the 
requirement that most subjudgments tally to 100%, accuracy was generally 
lower for items that consisted of two rather than three subitems (as 
with the non-mood items), and lower still for items that consisted of 
one judgment per item (as with the General Questions). A possible 
interpretation of these declines in accuracy is that the items that 
differ in number of subitems from the mood questions are also different 
in content, format, and/or difficulty or judgment (as was specifically 
hypothesized for the category judgments in the General Questions Section). 
Alternative hypotheses for the declines in accuracy on items with 
fewer subjudgments may help to clarify the nature of the various judgment 
strategies that may be available to subjects performing the tasks in 
this study, although they are less parsimonious and, therefore, less 
convincing. One such hypothesis is that the multiple subjudgments result 
in increased accuracy through improved guessing on the remaining 
subitems, after subitems for which the subject had better frequency 
information had first been performed. This is possible because the 
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subject was allowed to determine the order of subjudgments, although 
not the order of items. The first subjudgments made by a subject on an 
item, if accurate, would reduce the amount of error possible in the 
remaining two judgments, at least in the case of the mood items. If 
the remaining two subitems are merely guessed at (with the remaining 
percentage points distributed randomly between them), higher accuracy 
across the entire item would result than would be the case if these 
items had been guessed at independently. Another possible strategy that 
uses information on one subitem to improve accuracy on others would 
consist of performing the second and third judgments on a mood item 
(and even, perhaps, the first) as a rank orderly task, by distributing 
more of the remaining percentage points to the subitem thought to be 
more frequent. 
A strategy of using subitem information for subsequent subitems is 
constructable from an analogy to signal detection theory and related 
theories of judgment (Helson, 1959). A subjudgment for which some 
frequency counter information is detected (a clear internal signal) might 
be used as a perceptual anchor against which to compare and contrast 
the subitems for which less frequency counter information is held (a 
weaker internal signal). This hypothesis assumes that the subjects have 
a subjective perception of frequency counters, and that this perception 
can be improved through the use of a standard input or perceptual anchor. 
This improved performance through the use of perceptual anchor has been 
demonstrated in other physical and social perception judgments, along 
with contrast and assimilation effects similar to overestimation and 
underestimation effects found in the present study (Brickman, Coates, 
& Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Manis & Moore, 1978). 
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A way of interpreting the observed high correlations without 
recourse to either automatic processing theory or the effects of 
placing multiple subjudgments and restraints on the overall judgments, 
can be derived from personality theory and theories of personality 
testing. Instead of using automatically encoded frequency information, 
the subject may resort to a strategy that takes advantage of the self-
generated and self-related nature of the target frequencies. By 
referring to his or her self-concept (beliefs, expectations, and 
feelings about self), high correlations might be obtainable on the 
tasks used in this study, without the subject resorting to what might 
typically be called memory processes. If it were assumed that the 
subject was unaware of this strategy, while nonethless resorting to it, 
the projective hypothesis of personality testing would be relevant to 
the Memory Task data (Anastasi, 1982). With or without the assumption 
of awareness, such a strategy, would make the task more like the 
personality trait inventory than a measure of memory processes. 
A related possibility is that subjects weighed the subjective 
probability of different distributions of percentages when several 
subjudgments were required, using an implicit personality theory that 
contained accurate information about what traits could be expected to 
go together given a certain type of person, the self in the case of the 
present study (Kelly, 1955). The subject would be using both a self-
concept and an implicit personality theory (personally derived but with 
a high degree of consensus across persons within a given culture) to 
estimate what the subject thought should have been recorded on Daily 
Activity Reports, rather than memory for what was actually recorded. 
66 
It is conceivable that subjects might be able to provide highly 
accurate estimates of another subject's frequency, given a concept of 
the other person based on personal acquaintance or some other source of 
information, such as merely being told that a person was or was not a 
recovering alcoholic. 
Given these reservations, it is nonetheless parsimonious to view 
the high correlations of actual to estimated frequency found in the 
present study as (qualified) evidence for the automaticity of the 
encoding of frequency information. The qualifications related to viewing 
the results from the vantage point of personality theory are mitigated 
when the possible role of automatically encoded frequency information 
in the formation of concepts (including concepts of self and others) 
is taken into consideration (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). 
2. Actual frequency of occurrence will produce the only significant 
effect on estillates. The omnibus null hypothesis for effects on memory 
for frequency of occurrence was rejected for the present study. The 
prediction of no significant effects was rejected for both overall 
measures of relative accuracy, and for measures of relative and absolute 
accuracy across specific types of judgments. The demonstrated effects 
on accuracy included effects of the evaluative direction of judgments, 
of extremity of responses by evaluative direction, and group interaction 
effects. 
This pattern of results is what would have been expected of a 
study investigating effortful processes, rather than automatic 
processes, under Hasher and Zacks' framework. Rather than leading to 
the disconfirmation of the automatic processing hypothesis, its 
proponents might argue, the present study is not a good test of the 
hypothesis because the tasks used to measure memory required (or at 
least encourage strategies that require) large amounts of effortful 
processing. These effortful processes include performance of 
calculations, weighing of probabilities, and recall of crucial mood 
exemplars. It could be argued that the significant effects 
demonstrated in the present study were related to these effortful 
processes that are expected to vary with conditions. 
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The possibility of such an argument can be viewed as a major 
criticism of the automatic processing theory. As Green (1984) has 
pointed out, perhaps no meaningful test of the theory is possible, 
since it may not be feasible to devise meaningful, ecologically valid 
tasks that function without effortful processes. Given the support 
found for the first automatic processing hypothesis above and the lack 
of support for the second, it appears more parsimonious to acknowledge 
some automaticity in the encoding of frequency of occurrence 
information, without endorsing the invariance of such encoding as is 
advocated by Hasher and Zacks. 
Cognitive Impairment Hypotheses 
3. The recovery group will have significantly lower accuracy 
scores than the control group. Discussion of this hypotheses requires 
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clarification of the conflicting evidence from different measures of 
accuracy. On overall measures of absolute accuracy (hits) and relative 
accuracy (overall discrimination coefficients) the recovery group had 
consistently lower mean accuracy. The only overall measure on which 
this difference was significant was for a hit measure with success 
defined as the estimate being within 2.5 points of the actual frequency. 
The significant difference depended on the one-tailed prediction of this 
hypothesis. 
When accuracy for mood items grouped by evaluative connotation was 
investigated, ambiguous findings resulted. Because of different degrees 
of overestimation of positive items and underestimation of negative 
items, whenever one group had a higher absolute accuracy the other group 
had the higher relative accuracy and vice versa. The recovery group's 
mean accuracy was at times higher than the control group's mean accuracy, 
but this difference in favor of the recovery group was never significant. 
On three measures of accuracy across evaluative dimensions (relative 
accuracy for neithers, relative accuracy for positives, and composite 
absolute accuracy for negatives) the control group was significantly 
more accurate than the recovery group. This significantly higher 
accuracy for the control group is consistent with the cognitive 
impairment hypothesis, and could be interpreted as evidence in support 
of it. 
These findings do not necessarily substantiate the cognitive 
impairment hypothesis, however. The finding that the groups differ in 
level of accuracy by evaluative direction implicates factors other than 
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chemically induced cognitive impairment (the assumption underlying the 
hypothesis as framed in Chapter II). A rival hypothesis that would 
account for the lower accuracy of the recovery subjects and the 
interaction of group status and evaluative direction on accuracy can be 
framed by attributing the lower accuracy to the effects of depression. 
This alternative hypothesis will be pursued further in the integrative 
discussion, since it is relevant to most of the hypotheses entertained 
in the present study. For the discussion of this specific hypothesis, 
the alternative hypothesis that the two groups differ on level of 
depression points out the possibility of other variables (correlated 
with group status but not identical with alcoholism status) which may 
account for group differences. Some of the control subjects may 
themselves be undiagnosed alcholics. The groups may differ in gender, 
age, personal adjustment, motivation to participate, or other variables 
that may be relevant to group differences on a cognitive task. This 
raises the issue of the internal validity of the present study to be 
discussed in the critique subsection. 
JI. Group differences will be d•onstrated on evaluative category 
judgaents, but not oD spatial category judgaents. Recovery subjects 
will have significantly lower accuracy OD evaluative category 
judgaents. Evidence was found to support the implication that spatial 
category judgments are less sensitive to group differences than are 
evaluative category judgments, and therefore may be less sensitive to 
cognitive deficits. Each group obtained the highest accuracy scores 
on a spatial category judgment. For one group, the controls, the 
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difference between accuracy on spatial items and accuracy on evaluative 
items was found to be statistically significant. 
The main thrust of the above hypothesis, that recovery subjects 
would not perform as well as control subjects on evaluative judgments 
(presumably due to less cognitive capacity to perform the task) was 
clearly not supported. The control group was significantly less accurate 
on the evaluative judgments than the recovery group. This finding 
(although consistent with the trend for the control group's accuracy 
scores to be more sensitive to evaluative content) is inconsistent with 
viewing the differences between the two kinds of category tasks as 
related to task difficulty, while also hypothesizing higher cognitive 
functioning for the control group. The fact that the highest accuracy 
score for both groups was on a spatial judgment may not indicate any 
greater task difficulty for the evaluative judgments as cognitive tasks, 
but may instead reflect lowered accuracy on evaluative judgments due to 
underestimation and overestimation effects. These effects may themselves 
result from different response sets or availability heuristics for each 
group. Such response sets or heuristics would not be expected to 
significantly interfere with spatial category judgments. 
Availability Heuristic Hypothesis 
5. '!he groups will cliffer in the degree of underestiaation and 
overestillation of items that should be aore salient or relevant to 
recovering alcoholics. Items were not empirically determined to be 
abuser-relevant or more or less salient to alcoholics prior to the 
present study, due to limited resources. The basic thrust of this 
hypothesis, that groups would different in underestimation and 
overestimation of items, depending on the content of the items, can 
nonetheless still be tested. 
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For the non-mood items, which intuitively would seem more salient 
and relevant to alcholics, both groups showed less accuracy than on the 
mood items. The small number of these items and the absence of 
consistent group differences across them makes interpreting them as a 
group of variables unpromising. In fact, one might expect the subjects 
in the two groups to have used the scales of these items differently, 
while using the scales of mood items in a more similar way. This 
possibility will be further elaborated in the critique of the present 
study, since it raises the issue of whether any of the self-reports or 
subject estimates are truly comparable across groups. This is another 
threat to the internal validity of the present study. 
The mood items, however, are larger in number and do show consistent 
differences in accuracy. It was found that positive events were more 
related to accuracy for control group subjects than for recovery group 
subjects. Although both groups underestimated negative moods and 
underestimated positive mood states, control subjects made significantly 
higher overestimates of positive moods than recovery subjects. The 
difference between the groups on underestimation of negative moods was 
not significant. These findings suggest that it is the salience of items 
to control subjects that accounts for significant group differences, 
with the recovery subjects relatively less responsive to the content of 
items. The pattern of findings in the present study suggests that the 
positive items were more salient and memorable to the control subjects 
than to the recovery subjects. No corresponding type of item more 
salient to recovery subjects (as established by a stronger effect on 
their estimates) was demonstrated on the mood items. 
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Two alternative hypotheses not directly related to alcoholism or 
recovery status can be suggested to account for the differences in 
patterns of overestimation and underestimation of items depending on 
their evaluative content. The first hypothesis is that the groups 
differ in the mean level of depression, a variable known to affect 
judgments of items with evaluative, emotional, and self-referential 
content (Bowers, 1981; Curt, 1981; Nelson & Craighead, 1977). The 
second hypothesis is that the groups differ in response set, possibly 
due to different demand characteristics for the two groups. The 
personal significance and social context of the testing situation may 
have been very different for the two groups. Demand characteristics 
may have functioned to influence control group estimates in the 
direction of presenting a favorable image of themselves to the 
researchers both in the Daily Activity Reports and the Memory Task. 
The recovery group estimates, on the other hand, may have been 
influenced in the direction of presenting an image of self to the 
researchers that was consistent with the Alcholics Anonymous-oriented 
treatment that they had received at the testing center. 
Both of these alternative hypotheses will be further explored in 
the integrative discussion, since they have implications for the 
internal validity of the present study. 
Integrative Discussion 
Several theories related to memory for frequency of occurrences 
have been discussed as related to the individual hypotheses developed 
from them. Support was found for hypotheses under each theoretical 
umbrella, while others under the same theoretical framework were not 
confirmed. For the automatic processing hypothesis, evidence was 
found in favor of the automatic encoding of frequency information 
without intention or effort, but the hypothesized invariance of such 
encoding under differing conditions was rejected. The cognitive 
impairment hypothesis that frequency judgment performance would be 
negatively related to alcoholism was supported; but the hypothesis 
implying that this negative relationship to performance would be more 
dramatic on complex category frequency judgments was not supported. 
The availability heuristic prediction that recovery subjects and 
control subjects would differ in degree of underestimation and 
overestimation depending on the content of items was supported. 
The recovery group (as was hypothesized) was not the group which 
showed the strongest effects that might be interpreted as related 
to salience or relevancy of items (item content effects). 
Although the various theories have contradictory assumptions, a 
unified perspective is possible that accommodates all of them in an 
attempt to explain the findings of the present study. The remaining 
portion of this subsection will use the findings of the present study 
to outline what the principal elements of a more unified persepective 
would include, and what aspects of the three theories reviewed here 
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appear unsuited for an attempt to accommodate the three theories to the 
present findings. 
A more unified, eclectic perspective would hold that frequency 
encoding is automatic, in that it does not require intention or demand 
large amounts of cognitive capacity. At some point in the response 
system, however, it would have to be acknowledged that performances 
based on frequency information become vulnerable to the same influences 
that affect effortful processes. Whether this stage of vulnerability 
is at retrieval of encoded information or at the time or encoding may 
not be empirically determinable. 
Recovering alcoholics show less accuracy than controls on 
judgments of frequency, but these lowered performances may be interpreted 
as related to a combination of factors, some directly related to the 
neurological effects of substance abuse, and others not related to 
chemically-induced brain dysfunction. The lowered performances may be 
related to aspects of cognitive set, such as self-concept, self-
presentation related to demand characteristics, and personal constructs 
of the alcoholic. Affective sources of lowered performance could lead 
to both lowered capacity (as in depression or anxiety) and to systematic 
distortions related to differential availability of mood states. 
Accommodation to higher levels of emotional extremes might result in 
anchoring points different from control subjects, creating another 
source of group differences. Finally, some subtle neurological deficits 
may correlate with alcoholism but be causally orthogonal to any chemically-
induced damage. Hypothetically speaking, this could occur, for instance, 
in the case where a genetic factor leads to both suceptibility to 
addiction and subtle neuropsychological abnormalities. 
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Depression has been suggested at several junctures in the 
discussion of specific hypotheses as a variable that might account for 
many of the group differences reported here. The hypothesis that the 
two groups differ on main level of depression would be consistent with 
all of the theories entertained here, with the exception of the criteria 
of invariance across experimental conditions, which is part of Hasher 
and Zacks' automatic processing theory. The hypothesis based on this 
criteria was rejected in the present study. Nonetheless, automatic 
processing has much to add to an understanding of the ability of humans 
to judge frequencies of ev.ents. It is suggested that any unified 
perspective on the encoding of frequency information not include this 
criteria for automaticity, as originally formulated, but should instead 
view this criteria as a statement of relative invariance. In its 
present form it is either not true, given the results of the present 
study, or not amenable to a meaningful test, in that all significant 
human performances to some degree involve effortful processes. 
Although depression and its effects on memory for frequency of 
occurrences was not the original focus of this study, and a full 
discussion of the influence of depression on the findings reported here 
are beyond the scope of the present discussion, a brief review of factors 
that implicate depression as a relevant variable is in order. A review 
of the literature focusing on the differences between studies of the 
automaticity of frequency encoding and studies of the effects of 
depression on memory has described the two kinds of studies as 
differing in stimuli, type of judgment and measure of accuracy (Curt, 
1981). Depression studies were typified as using emotionally charged 
materials, requiring category judgments of the subject, and using 
absolute measures of accuracy. Frequency studies were typified as 
using innocuous materials, requiring item frequency judgments of the 
subjects and using relative measures of accuracy. Both types of 
studies used some measure of depression as a variable. 
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The present study, in terms of its materials, methods, and 
subjects, is well suited to demonstrate the effects of a depressive 
memory on frequency of occurrence, if such effects exist. It combines 
all aspects of both types of study described by Curt (1981), except 
perhaps truly innocuous stimuli, since all the stimuli for the present 
study were self-relevant and therefore could be assumed to carry some 
emotional significance for the subject. What is not present is some 
measure of depression. If, however, the level of frequency for 
negative mood items can be interpreted as a rough index of depression, 
it could be argued that the recovery group and the control group are, 
in fact, a higher depression group and lower depression group, 
respectively. The higher incidence of depression in a group of 
recovering alcholics is consistent with reports in the clinical 
literature. The high incidence of depression among alcoholics bas been 
a cornerstone of some theoretical and treatment approaches to alcohol 
addiction (Jones, 1968; 1971; Wikler, 1973; Woodruff, Guze, Clayton, & 
Carr, 1973). 
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It is probable that depressed and non-depressed persons are in 
each group, with the recovery group having more depressed persons, 
and/or more severely depressed persons. The subjects could be described 
as forming four groups: depressed controls, non-depressed controls, 
depressed recovery subjects, and non-depressed recovery subjects. Six 
groups could be formed with severity of depression as another grouping 
factor. The depressed individual in each group would be expected to 
have generally lower accuracy of estimates, more reactivity to negative 
mood items, and less reactivity to positive mood states, as reflected 
in accuracy measures. Such a situation would mask even stronger 
underestimation and overestimation effects than those demonstrated in 
the present study, which used only alcoholism as the grouping factor. 
If depression is a variable relevant to group differences found 
here, the question arises as to whether the depressed condition is a 
state or trait depression. Based on Bower's (1981) work on the effects 
of mood on memory, one may speculate that perhaps temporary mood states 
are influencing accuracy in the present study, in addition to any effects 
of long-term mood or cognitive dispositions. Bower used hypnosis and 
reading of emotionally charged self-reference statements to induce happy 
or sad mood states prior to a memory task. He demonstrated that persons 
so induced had better recall for material that was similar in evaluative 
content to their mood state. He has labeled this effect of better recall 
of mood-congruent material a "mood-state-dependent memory" effect. 
Salience of material that is similar in content to the induced mood has 
also been demonstrated by Bower and associated workers, and labeled "the 
mood congruity effect" (Bower, 1981). Bower frames his work as an 
extension of the availability heuristic and defined both mood-state-
dependent memory effects and mood congruity effects as "automatic." 
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Such effects could be integrated into a unified perspective to aid 
in the explanation of group differences in the present study. If it 
can be assumed that the mood state at the time of the testing would have 
been a random sample of mood states from the same population as those 
recorded on the Daily Activity Reports, there is a high probability that 
the two groups differed naturally in mood state at the time of testing, 
with the recovery subjects having, on the average, a more negative set of 
moods than the control subjects. This alone might account for different 
degrees of overestimation and underestimation of mood item frequencies 
observed between the two groups, if frequency judgments are vulnerable 
to mood-state-dependent effects. 
In addition the groups may have, inadvertently, received inductions 
for different moods states at the time of the testing, by way of the 
different testing and participation contexts for the two groups. For 
example, if the ending of participation was experienced by most subjects 
as a positive event due to a sense of accomplishment, an awareness of 
having been helpful, or due to the relief from being "on the beeper," 
control subjects may have been primed by this positive experience to 
have a mood congruent with positive memories. At the time of the 
testing. the recovery group would be without an equivalent priming for 
positive moods. In fact, the recovery group subjects were often 
scheduled for their interviews on evenings when their outpatient therapy 
or other treatment activities were scheduled as well, as a matter of 
convenience. The anticipated or residual moods related to these 
activities could have induced mood priming of a different nature from 
that which may have been experienced by the control group subjects. 
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A complete investigation of the possible influences of state or 
trait depression on estimates of frequency of occurrences is clearly 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nevertheless, the 
importance of integrating both cognitive and affective factors in an 
approach to understanding memory processes is suggested by the findings 
of the present study. Both Bower (1981) and Hasher and Zacks (1984) 
conclude influential articles in cognitive psychology by stressing the 
importance of investigating cognitive processes in the light of 
emotional and unconscious processes. The discussion of the present 
findings might best be concluded by echoing this call, by suggesting 
that emotional and unconscious factors are relevant to an understanding 
of memory for frequency of occurrences. 
Critique of the Present Study 
Although random sampling from the recovery subject pool and 
stratified sampling of the community sample were used, the present 
study, nonetheless, has all of the weaknesses and limitations of a 
correlational design. In the context of a correlational design, the 
use of terms such as "effect," "interaction," or other terms 
designating causal relationships, must be seen as tentative, in that 
correlational designs cannot in themselves demonstrate causal 
relationships. They are relevant, however, to causal hypotheses, in 
that they expose them to disconfirmation (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; 
Kaz din, 1980) • 
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Given this design limitation, other limitations are also present. 
Several of these are related to the composition of the groups. The 
groups were not demonstrated to be homogeneous in respect to alcoholism 
status. A criterion for inclusion in the community sample was that they 
had no history of treatment for substance abuse. Given this criterion, 
some use of psychotropic substances would probably be expected by 
community sample subjects. It is highly possible that some undiagnosed 
substance abusers or recovered alcoholics served as community sample 
subjects. Conversely, the recovery group was not homogenous for simple 
alcohol abuse; poly-drug abuse and eating disorders were also diagnosed 
for some of these subjects, and may have been present without diagnosis 
in others. Personality disorders, mood disorders, and other kinds of 
psychological pathology were also diagnosed in the pool of subjects from 
which the recovery group subjects were drawn for the present study. 
This is less problematic, however, and actually adds to the ecological 
validity of the present study, since these disorders may be casually 
related to some cases of substance abuse. 
The groups were not shown to be equivalent on a large number of 
variables that might influence performance on the Memory Task. Age, 
gender, personal adjustment, participation in psychotherapy, motivation 
for participation in the context study, and education are a few of the 
possible variables that were not controlled for by selection or by post 
facto analysis in the present experiment. Any one of these variables, 
or interactions among them, may have accounted for the observed group 
differences, rather than alcoholism status. 
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In addition, self-selection factors were operative in the 
formation of groups, in that community sample subjects were volunteers 
recruited via public announcement. Volunteers willing to agree to two 
weeks of intensive participation in a relatively intrusive self-report 
study may differ significantly from the typical person. Recovery 
subjects were recent inpatients as well as volunteers. Persons will to 
participate in another program in addition to outpatient therapy, and 
A.A. activities, may differ from those who do not choose to do so. 
Since all persons taking the Memory Task must have participated for at 
least two weeks in the context study, differential drop out may have 
also influenced group composition, since it is reasonable to assume that 
the pressures for dropping out are not the same for recovering patients 
as for members of the community sample. 
Another hypothesis that threatens the internal validity of the 
present study is that the two groups may have received different 
treatments. The groups may differ significantly in the motives for and 
understandings of their participation in the context study. The groups 
may have also received different treatments in the form of different 
testing contexts, and different experimenter biases at the time of 
testing. For example, researchers involved in the context study were 
also involved in treatment situations. Recovering subjects may have 
seen their participation in the study as related to treatment despite 
explicit denials of this by the researchers. This may have led to 
placebo effects. Demand characteristics different from those of the 
control subjects may have been established, such as a response set 
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designed to please researchers, and through them, therapists. The 
recovery subjects may have been motivated to express attitudes toward 
the treatment facility and the therapy received there through responses 
on both the Daily Activity Reports and the Memory Task estimates. Any 
of these possibilities might result in group differences not essentially 
related to alcoholism status. 
Several threats to the validity of the present study are related 
to experimenter effects. The Memory Task was administered for both 
groups by research assistants. These assistants at times had previous 
contacts with recovery subjects, while this was usually not the case 
with the control group subjects. At the time of testing, the recovery 
subjects could anticipate another 10 weeks of contact with the 
researchers. The control group was ending contact with the program. 
This difference in social context for the testing may have influenced 
estimates. As mentioned in the integrative discussion, mood priming 
may have inadvertently occurred, resulting in different mood states or 
intensified mood states that may have influenced each group's estimates 
differently. 
Another problem related to the administration of the Memory Task 
is the fact that the assistants who administered the task were aware 
that one hypothesis of the memory study involved lower performance for 
the recovery subjects than for the control subjects. A subtle bias may 
have been introduced in the administration of the test. Another possible 
source of unconscious experimenter bias lies in the fact that all of 
the data for the present study were coded by the primary researcher, who 
was obviously aware of each specific hypothesis. The coding and 
rounding of responses could have been influenced by a subtle bias. 
The relative objectivity of the responses makes this source of bias 
unlikely, however, because no rounding was performed on estimates or 
measures of accuracy used in analyzes. 
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Another limitations of the present study is the lack of any 
empirical foundation for the assumption that the two groups did not 
differ in the use of the scales used to record experiences. An extreme 
happy state may be experienced differently by different individuals. 
The same mood state could be expressed differently by different 
individuals on the Daily Activity Report. These differences in 
individual use of the scale may have resulted in significant group 
differences. This problem in the use of scales for rating mood states 
may not be as relevant from the point of view of automatic processing 
theory, since the actual extremity of a response should not have 
influenced the ability to estimate the frequency of responses. From 
other theoretical approaches to memory for frequency of occurrences, 
such as availability heuristics or Bower's mood congruence sub-theory 
of availability, different uses of the scales between groups would 
obscure actual levels of mood between groups, and would be a serious 
confounding of variables. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Studies of memory for frequency of occurrences that utilize the 
self-relevant, self-generated, and evaluatively laden stimuli of the 
type used in the present study may add to an understanding of the role 
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of unconscious and emotional factors in the use of frequency information. 
Empirical investigation of the use of the specific self-report scales 
and of item salience by the relevant grouping variables would be an 
important addition to the methods of the present study. 
The addition of other grouping variables, such as depression, 
defensiveness (denial of negative emotions or experiences, for example) 
organicity, or personality disturbance, and early versus late recovery 
from addiction, would add to an understanding of the effect of these 
variables on frequency judgment performance. The degree of confidence 
in judgments, subject awareness of overestimation and underestimation 
effects, motivation related effects, and subject reports of cognitive 
strategies used in performing the tasks should be investigated. In 
addition to self-reports of cognitive strategies, the subject's relevant 
behaviors, such as the order of subitem completion, could be recorded 
and used as predictors of accuracy. Intentional mood priming by 
experimenters could be added to future designs, along with measures of 
the subject's mood at arrival at the testing site. In general, variables 
of relevance to both affective and unconscious processes in addition to 
variables related to cognitive capacity and cognitive strategy should 
be investigated for their relationship to the ability to accurately 
estimate frequencies of self-generated occurrences. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A - DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT 
Time Beeped: Time Filled Out: 
As you were beeped • 
What were you thinking about? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Where were you? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
What was the MAIN thing you were doing? 
How much choice did you have in 
Not at 
all 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Some-
what Quite Very 
selecting this activity? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Did you feel in control of your 
activity? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How guilty did you feel? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How vulnerable did you feel? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How self-conscious were you? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How much were you concentrating? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How satisfied did you feel with 
yourself? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 
Describe your mood as you were beeped: 
Very Quite Some Neither Some Quite Very 
Alert 0 0 0 0 Drowsy 
Happy 0 0 0 0 Sad 
Irritable 0 0 0 0 Cheerful 
Strong 0 0 0 0 Weak 
Angry 0 0 0 0 Friendly 
Active 0 0 0 0 Passive 
Lonely 0 0 0 0 Sociable 
Adequate 0 0 0 0 Inadequate 
Free 0 0 0 0 Constrained 
Excited 0 0 0 0 Bored 
Proud 0 0 0 0 Ashamed 
Confused 0 0 0 0 Clear 
Tense 0 0 0 0 Relaxed 
Fat 0 0 0 0 Thin 
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Describe your physical state as you were beeped: 
none slight moderate severe 
Hunger +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Tired, slowed down 
Aches & pains 
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
At the time you were beeped: 
Who were 
you with? 
( ) alone 
( ) spouse 
( ) brother(s), sister(s) 
( ) friend(s): number 
( ) male ( ) female 
( ) mother 
( ) father 
( ) strangers 
( ) coworkers 
( ) other(s) 
---
Describe how you feel about one of the persons you were with: 
(If alone and thinking about someone, describe feelings about that person.) 
very middle very 
Close to +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ Distant from 
Inferior to +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Friendly Toward +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
In control of +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Supported by +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
(Identify the person you are referring to: .) 
How preoccupied were you with 
Not at 
all 
Some-
what Quite 
Superior to 
Angry with 
Control! ed by 
Rejected by 
Very 
eating? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How preoccupied were you with 
drinking/using? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Do you feel your eating has 
been out of control since 
last report? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
How confident did you feel that 
you could resist the urge to 
binge eat? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
Did you share your feelings 
with someone close to you? +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Indicate your alcohol intake since the last report: 
Beer Wine Liquor 
No. of ()oz. No. of Oz. No. Of ()oz. 
Units Per Unit Units Per Unit Units Per Unit 
cans (12oz.) __ glasses (10 oz.) shots (1-1/2 oz.) 
cans ( 16 oz.) fifths (26 oz.) drinks (1-1/2 oz.) 
bottles (12 oz.) __ quarts (32 oz.) __ pints ( 16 oz.) 
__ glasses (10 oz.) liters (33-1/2 oz.) fifths (26 oz.) 
__ quarts (32 oz.) 
Indicate your drug use (what and how much) since the last report: 
Indicate your foot intake since the last report: 
Type Quantity No. No. 
Binges __ Binges __ 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Great thoughts, Day dreams, Nasty cracks, Cartoons and Jokes • • • 
APPENDIX B - MEMORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
NOTE: Use this answer sheet and a blank booklet to get the person oriented 
to the task. 
KEY POINTS: 
1. Want to get the subject to think about how he/she filled out the 
booklet, not how they felt then or now about the items. Many subjects 
may use their recollection of feelings to "jog" their memories as 
to how they filled out the book. 
2. These responses are in terms of percentages of 100%. 
3. After you explain the task, see if they can tell you what they are 
going to be doing. 
4. "General Explanation": We are trying to understand how people 
remember and what ways people may or may not use to remember things. 
What we'd like you to do is help us in the memory test. There are 
no right or wrong answers. All we will ask you to do is remember 
some aspects of what you have been doing in regards to the patient 
workbook. 
We are going to concentrate on trying to find out how you filled 
out ("marked") the book; not how you were feeling. This memory 
task is only related to how you filled out the qustions. 
5. Under the heading of General Questions: 
The first two (#1 and #2) refer to a special dimension of memory. 
All these questions are getting at is how often the mark was to 
the right or left of the page. 
Question #2 and #3 are related to the positive and/or negative 
dimension of the item. This is the emotional/feeling aspect of 
the task. 
Help the subjects understand these two related, but by very 
distinct tasks. Repeat it or have them repeat it before they do 
the task. You can refer to the mood rating scale on the page 
itself or to the unanswered page in the booklet. 
6. When the subject actually gets to the mood items that are scaled 
like the booklet, make it clear that the (brackets) 
over the various responses are calling for a summary of those marks. 
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The total repsonse should equal 100%. They can answer the questions 
any way they choose (e.g., figuring out j positive, then neutral, 
and then negative or whatever sequence they choose). 
7. The final four questions ask for two ratings that cut across these 
dimensions. Again, these are summaries of their marks and the total 
has to equal 100%. 
Refer to the blank booklet to orient subject, if necessary. 
8. Some subjects, when given the instructions, will feel it is impossible 
to do. Encourage them, provide extra time, suggest that whatever 
they can do will be helpful. 
If subject persists, then excuse him/her from the task. 
SCHEDULE OF SUBJECTS 
1. Presently Active Subjects 
Gp I Book 6 Overall Assessment 
Gp II Overall Assessment 
2. New Subjects as of 5/21/84 
Gp I Book 1 Book 6 Overall Assessment 
Gp II Book 1 x Overall Assessment 
3. Community Sample 
Book 1 
These forms will be located in a folder in Lil's desk (marked "Memory 
Study") and will be in the appropriate folders when subjects return. 
A red dot will remind you that the task needs to be done on a given 
subject. 
WJF/gj 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Henry Jay Richards has been read and approved 
by the following committee: 
Dr. Eugene Zechmeister, Director 
Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. Alan De Wolfe 
Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
Dr. William Reich 
Associate Professor, Psychology, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and 
the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary 
changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given final 
approval by the Committee with reference to content and form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement 
for the degree of Master of Arts. 
I I 
! 
;6~.._/?44'~ 
Dirl'ctor•s Signature Date 
